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ABSTRACT
Market Reaction to Seasoned Equity Offerings: The Relevance of 
Leverage, Growth Opportunities, and Corporate Structure
Mojib Ahmed 
Old Dominion University, 1998 
Chair: Dr. Kenneth Yung
Empirical work on the market’s reaction to seasoned equity offerings has rarely 
considered the impact of the issuing firm’s leverage level or it’s corporate structure. This 
work is an attempt to include these parameters in order to better understand the market’s 
reaction to such issue announcements.
The current finance literature recognizes the fact that leverage plays an important 
role in assessing the value of the firm. Leverage has both negative and positive impacts 
on the value of a firm (McConnell and Servaes, 1995), and thus, has both negative and 
positive impacts on the market’s reaction to seasoned equity offerings. This work 
attempts to isolate the positive and negative impacts of leverage, and finds that whether 
the issue is viewed negatively or positively depends on the nature of the issue and the 
issuer’s characteristics.
Contradicting the traditional view of the positive impact of growth opportunities 
on the market’s reaction to issue announcements, this paper argues that the impact of 
growth opportunities on seasoned equity offerings should be negative. This is because 
most of the issuing firms are high growth firms, and the issue itself cannot be a success 
unless the issue implies a growth opportunity. The marginal growth impact of the issue 
becomes the dominant force in determining the direction of the market reaction. As the 
marginal growth impact of issue investment is greater for low-growth opportunity firms, 
the low-growth opportunity firms have a less negative market reaction to seasoned equity 
announcements than do high-growth opportunity firms. Additionally, high growth 
opportunity firms also suffer from a higher level o f information asymmetry. The 
empirical findings overwhelmingly support the both arguments.
While examining the impact o f corporate structure on the market’s reaction to 
seasoned equity offerings, it is found that high-focused firm’s seasoned equity issue 
announcements have a less negative market reaction than those of low-focused diversified 
firms. But firms which have increased their focus level in the recent past have a greater 
negative market reaction to an equity issue than do the firms which have decreased their 
focus. It is argued that issue announcements preceded by divestiture makes the market 
skeptical about the financing need o f the issuer.
Co-chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mohammad Najand
Dr. Vinod Agarwal
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent work, Lee, Lockhead, Ritter, and Zhao 
(1996) documented that the average cost of raising external 
capital for U.S. corporations is higher for equity based1 
financing than debt based financing. Using data from 19 90 
to 1994, they found that the average direct cost of 
financing from initial public offerings (IPOs) is about 11.0 
percent. The average direct cost for seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) is 7.1 percent. For convertible and 
straight debt the costs are 3.8 percent and 2.2 percent 
respectively2. Yet, the total number of equity (IPOs and 
SEOs) offerings are about three times the debt (convertible 
and straight) offerings.
Lee, et. a l .(1996), also documented that the number of 
seasoned equity issue events surpasses the combined total 
numbers of convertible and straight debt issue events.
During the same period(1990-1994) the number of seasoned
1 Equity sold to the new investors. It is possible that 
some of the new investors are existing shareholders
2 It is possible that the reported cost of debt issue does 
not include the implied cost of issuing debt, such as 
bankruptcy cost, agency cost and so forth.
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equity offering events was 1.5 times the number of straight 
debt issuing events. The puzzling part of these findings is 
that a lot of empirical studies indicate that the stock 
market reaction to equity offering is significantly negative 
and therefore value decreasing for the issuing firm.
On the other hand, some studies do find insignificant 
positive market reaction to seasoned equity offerings. The 
works that have reported the percentage of positive 
responses include: Barclay and Litzenberger (1988), Bradford 
(1987), Choi, Masulis, and Nanda (1992), and Varma (1995). 
The reported numbers of significant positive responses range 
between 19% (Barclay and Litzenberger) and 27% (Varma) .
Thus it seems that about one-quarter of the sample firms 
experience positive abnormal returns with the announcement 
of seasoned equity financing. Thus, if equity issues are 
value decreasing, then why are so many firms choosing to 
issue equity?
Given the dichotomous evidence of negative and positive 
market reaction to equity offerings the present work 
contributes to the literature by making an empirical 
assessment of how a firm's leverage and growth opportunities 
would affect the market reaction to firm's seasoned equity
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offering. The significance of this contribution is that so 
far, the effect of leverage and growth opportunities have 
been considered in isolation without any consideration of 
their possible mutual interaction. This study also 
contributes to the current literature by examining the 
impact of corporate structure on seasoned equity issue 
announcements. The examination of issuing firm's leverage, 
growth opportunities and corporate structure is expected to 
provide some missing pieces of the puzzles related to the 
issue of seasoned equity offerings. This would facilitate a 
more accurate understanding of the market's behavior around 
the seasoned equity announcements.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as:
Section II - reviews the empirical and theoretical 
researches on the valuation effect of equity financing; 
Section III - addresses the impact of issuing firm's 
existing leverage on the value of the issuing firm's at the 
announcement of such issue and different hypotheses were 
developed. This section also develops hypotheses regarding 
the impact of diversification on the market reaction to 
seasoned equity offerings. Section IV - describes the data 
collection process and outlines the methodology. Section V
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contains the results of the event study and cross sectional 
analysis of the hypotheses developed in section III.
Finally, Section VI concludes the study.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior to Modigliani and Miller's (MM) capital 
irrelevance theory (1958) , the corporate capital market was 
not as sophisticated as today. The capital market at that 
time consisted fundamentally of equities and occasionally 
debt. Debt was viewed as a necessary evil (Donaldson,
1963) . Firms would only issue debt when equity issues were 
not a viable option. In 1963, the MM tax correction paper 
changed manifestly the attitude of academics towards debt to 
a warm embrace. More recently, finance researchers have 
broadened their view on debt financing and have identified 
other associated benefits and detriments. Today whether a 
new investment should be financed through equity or debt or 
a combination of both depends on the relative cost3 and 
benefit of such financing on the value of the firm. As 
managers try to maximize shareholder's wealth, reaction of
3 These costs include all direct costs, such as, the cost 
of issue, impacts on the overall cost of capital, and 
indirect costs, such as, the agency cost of debt, and the 
agency costs of managerial discretion.
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the capital market assumes a crucial role in the choice of 
corporate financing4.
There have been extensive efforts by researchers to 
isolate the differential impacts of each type of offering. 
Smith (1986) put forth four generalizations of the impact of 
external financing on the value of the firm that previous 
empirical research had discovered:5 (1) External financing 
does not increase the value of the firm; (2) Equity 
financing is more value decreasing than debt or preferred 
stock financing; (3) Debts which are convertible to stock 
carry a greater negative impact than those which are not 
convertible; and (4) Industrial firms suffer more value loss 
with external financing than do Utilities.6
4 For example, capital market prices provide vital signals 
for corporate investment decisions
5 Increase or decrease in the value of the firm is measured 
using abnormal return associated with the announcement of 
such offering around the event date.
6 For details of the empirical researches please refers to: 
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhler (1985), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Parch (1986), 
Schipper and Smith (1986), Pettway and Radcliff (1985), 
Linn and Pinegar (1985), Dann and Mikkelson(1984), Eckbo
(1986) .
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The following is a review of the theories on the 
impacts of financing decision on the market reaction to 
seasoned equity offerings.
A: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Information Asymmetry
In 1984, Myers and Majluf presented the seminal paper, 
"Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have". The model 
developed therein overwhelmingly supports the findings of 
existing empirical researches. The model holds that equity 
financing always has negative consequences due to the 
existence of information asymmetry between the management 
and the existing stockholders with respect to the firm's 
assets in place and with respect to the net present value of 
the new investment project.
Under the theory of separation of ownership and 
management7, the investors do not have direct access to the 
inside information about the firm's assets in place as well
7 The concept of separation of Ownership and management and 
the research work on this area can be traced back to as 
early as Berle and Means(1932).
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as to the net present value of the investment to be 
undertaken through the new financing. Management, by virtue 
of their inside position, possesses more information about 
the value of the firm (i.e., the assets in place) as well as 
the intrinsic value of new projects. Investors, on the 
other hand, learn about the value of the business and about 
any new investment project through the market and from the 
signals management provides from time to time.
In the Myers and Majluf model, as new investment 
opportunities become available, management will try to 
maximize the wealth of current/existing shareholders. If 
faced with a new project, the decision to issue equity to 
finance the project conveys a signal to the market that 
management feels the firm is overvalued in the market. 
Investors, being aware of this behavior of management, will 
attempt to protect their own interests when a seasoned 
equity issue occurs by re-valuing the stock, thus leading to 
a negative market reaction. Thus, according to Myers and 
Majluf's Information Asymmetry Theory firms never issue 
equity if it has the opportunity to use other means of 
financing.
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The information asymmetry theory also suggests that 
there exists a positive correlation between the level of 
information asymmetry and the level of value drop in the 
event of equity financing (Dierkens, 1991). Based on Myers 
and Majluf's information asymmetry theory, Dierkens (1991) 
concluded that increases in the information asymmetry 
between management and stockholders, will significantly 
increase the drop in price of the stock observed at the 
equity issue announcement. A timing test (Dierkens, 1991) 
also showed that firms time their equity issue announcement 
when the level of information asymmetry is relatively low.
In the extreme, a fully levered firm should suffer minimal 
value loss due to the absence of information asymmetry, 
whereas, a fully unlevered firm should suffer maximum value 
loss due to the maximum level of information asymmetry.
B : Seasoned Equity Offerings & Growth Opportunities
While many empirical researchers confirmed Myers and 
Majluf's prediction's concerning seasoned equity issues, a 
separate strand of literature challenges the model's
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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prediction of seasoned equity offerings of always having a 
negative effect on firm's value. Their argument is based on 
the Growth Theory literature, where it is argued that 
market's reaction to seasoned equity offerings is a function 
of the issuing firm's level of growth opportunities when the 
financing decision is announced. Some researchers have used 
the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities 
of the firm, while most of others have used Tobin's Q as a 
measure of firm's growth and/or growth opportunities.
While examining the market reaction to equity issue 
announcements Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) found a 
positive but insignificant correlation between the 
announcement returns of the issuing firms and their Tobin's 
Q ratios. Kato and Schallheim (1992) found that the two-day 
market model prediction errors for 63 Japanese public equity 
announcements during the 1970s were on average negative, but 
the prediction errors were positive for the 113 
announcements during the 1980s. The book-to-market value 
ratio for the respective two periods were 2.72 for 1970s and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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5.87 for 1980s, and both results were statistically 
significant8.
Denis(1994) reported that the equity issue announcement 
effects are significantly negative for low-growth firms, but 
not significantly negative for high growth firms. The 
findings are confirmation of the theoretical modification of 
Myers and Majluf's (1984) model by Cooney and Kalay(l993).
The modified model shows that always-negative outcome of 
equity issuance on the value of the issuing firm is a direct 
outcome of Myers and Majluf's assumption that the net 
present value of the project a firm is facing is always non­
negative. In other words, Myers and Majluf's model does not 
allow for the most straightforward possibility that a firm 
may not issue new equity just because all available projects 
have negative net present value. The modified model also 
supports the view of Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) who 
argued that positive announcement effects are not merely a 
noise. Barcley and Litzenberger (1988) found that about 17% 
of the stocks trading in the first 15 minutes after an 
equity announcement had non-negative (of which 7.8% is
8 It is important to mention that this finding is more just 
merely the result of differential accounting practices in 
Japan.
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positive) returns. During the next 15-minute interval, 49% 
had non-negative (of which 26.7% is positive) returns9.
Using Miller and Rock's (1985) model, Pilotte (1992) 
argues that the stock price reaction to new financing 
depends on the market1s imperfect assessment of the offering 
firm's growth opportunities. Ambarish, John and William
(1987) construct a model in which financing and dividends 
convey information about the value of the assets in place 
and/or the value of the growth opportunities of the issuing 
firm. They argued that for a mature firm the predominant 
source of information is assets in place as their growth 
opportunities are limited, hence, the announcement effect 
should be negative. For a rapidly growing firm the 
predominant source of information asymmetry are the growth 
opportunities, thus, the effect should be positive10.
9 As it is obvious that the variance of the daily returns 
are much higher than 30-minutes return variance, it is 
safe to conclude that the positive returns observed were 
not merely the product of noise.
10 Ambarish, John, and William (1987) assert that their 
model correctly reflects the existing literature as most 
of the studies only includes New York Stock Exchange and 
American Stock Exchange and firms listed in these 
exchanges are mostly mature firms.
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Jensen (1986)'s Free Cash Flow Theory also supports the 
argument of Ambarish, John, and William's above argument. 
Free Cash Flow Theory argues that the presence of free 
cashflow reduces the value of the firm. It is expected that 
mature firms should have more free cashflow than the growth 
firm due to their limited growth opportunities. The higher 
the cashflow, the more likely that money will be spent 
unwisely because, agency theory suggests that managers 
always have incentives for increasing the size of the firm 
beyond optimum. Therefore, when market sees that a mature 
firm is expanding through equity issuance it reacts 
negatively as such increase in the cash flow may cause the 
increase in organizational inefficiencies. On the other 
hand an equity issue by a rapidly growing firm should signal 
manager's intention of maximizing organization's wealth 
through investment in new proj ect.
Recent empirical works have produced some very- 
different results while examining the relationship between 
issuing firms growth opportunities and announcement effect 
of seasoned equity offerings. Investigating the long term 
performance of equity issuers, Gombala, Lee, and Liu, (1998) 
observes that growth firms are performing poorly in the long
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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run when compared to low-growth firms. Their argument is 
that overpricing is greater for the high-growth opportunity 
firms than the low-growth opportunity firms, hence, high 
growth opportunity firms under-perform low growth 
opportunity firms. In another recent work McLaughlin, 
Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1998) has documented that market 
reaction to seasoned equity offering is more negative for 
high growth opportunity (Tobin's Q) firms than the low 
growth opportunity firms. They argued that high growth 
opportunity is associated with high level of information 
asymmetry between the investors and managers, and hence 
leads to higher negative market reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings. They also argue that bigger firms have lower 
level of information asymmetry than the smaller firms, 
because for smaller firms fewer analysts follow the 
company11.
11 Opler and Titman(1995) also used firms size as a proxy 
for information asymmetry.
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C: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Leverage
The impact of leverage on firm value is extensively- 
analyzed in the finance literature on Agency theory. Apart 
from the benefit of leverage through decreasing information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers, and also the 
minimization of the overall cost of capital of the firm as 
addressed by the traditional finance theory, a firm's debt 
level may affect the ability of the firm to materialize all 
possible future net present value projects. Myers (1977) 
called this problem as 'underinvestment problem'. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) called this the opportunity cost of not 
being able to finance good investment projects, i.e., 'the 
agency cost of debt'12,13.
One major implied assumption of Myers and Majluf's 
(1984) model is that the firm making the equity issue
12 Discussion on this is restricted to the extend it is 
relevant to the paper.
13 Agency theory suggest that there exist conflicting 
interest between the insiders and outsiders(stockholders 
and debtholders) of a firm. Jensen and Meckling(1976) 
argue that unless the management holds 100% of the equity 
of the firm, there exists sufficient ground to believe 
that managers have incentives for not acting at the full 
interest of the stockholders, (for more detail on the 
subject please refer to Jensen and Meckling(1976)
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announcement is an unlevered firm, hence there is no agency- 
cost of debt. However, most firms in the market are levered 
firms. In levered firms, in addition to existing and 
potential stockholders, there are creditors who also monitor 
the activities of management, then, it can be argued that 
the market has more information about the firm and it's 
management's activity. Thus, the existence of debt in the 
firm's capital structure decreases the level of information 
asymmetry between the outside investors (both stockholders 
and creditors) and the management. Thus, the greater is the 
level of leverage, more is the level of monitoring, 
therefore, the lower is the level of information asymmetry 
and vice versa.
Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) explored the relationship 
between leverage and future growth opportunities for all 
Compustat firms over the period of 1970 through 1989. j.ney 
found that for firms with poor investment opportunities, 
book leverage14 is strongly negatively correlated to the 
various growth measures15. Titman and Wessels (1988), and
14 Calculated as book value of debt over total assets.
15 The growth measures used are Subsequent growth in number 
of employees and Capital expenditure.
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Smith and Watts (1992) also documented a negative 
relationship between the investment and/or growth 
opportunities and firms leverage ratio.
Raymar(1993) argues that an equity issue may be a 
positive event when a firm has bonds outstanding. Thus, he 
argues that, financing need not follow a pecking order in 
which debt is the first choice of a quality firm. His 
reasoning for positive signaling is that "... a low-value 
firm faces greater default risk than a high-value firm so 
that its bonds have lesser value. Although the low-value 
firm may be able to issue overpriced stock, it might instead 
offer new debt if equity causes the value of old bonds to be 
much higher. The market would then view equity as a 
favorable signal that the risky low-value firm would not 
imitate" (Raymar, 1994, p322) . Raymar then developed a 
model where he examined a full set of possible outcomes in 
the presence of debt. He showed that in the presence of 
sufficient degree of leverage and default risk a positive 
market response is possible for equity issuance.
The issue of agency cost associated with equity 
financing is strongly addressed by Jung, Kim, and Stulz 
(1996). They argue that by assuming the issuing firms are
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
unlevered (by the empirical research), the agency cost does 
not go away. Taking the assumption of Myers and Majluf's 
unlevered firm, Jung at el. argue that if the issuing firm 
is unlikely to have valuable investment opportunities (i.e., 
low Q firms) then the news of managers making equity 
announcement conveys the impression that the firm is faced 
with unforeseen investment opportunity which managers can 
not pass over, if they (managers) want to maximize the value 
of the firm (i.e., maximizing the value of existing 
stockholders). In such cases, the effect of such 
announcement is expected to be positive. But as soon as the
issue of agency cost of managerial discretion is introduced
such issuance is no longer a good news, rather it is more of 
a bad news. It is likely that if the project is not a net
present value project managers will prefer to use equity
over debt, because debt financing for a negative net present 
value project reduces managers discretion over the firms 
resources (Jung et a l ., 1996).
More interesting is when the firm under consideration 
is a levered firm. McConnell and Servaes (1995) concluded 
that high-growth firm's corporate value is negatively
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correlated with leverage, and for the low-growth firm the 
correlation is positive. Their argument is that if the 
firms have plenty of growth opportunities then leverage will 
force the firm to give up positive net present value 
projects, on the other hand if a firm's growth is low such 
prevention will help to avoid manager's decision to take 
negative investment projects. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) 
also documented a negative relationship between the growth 
opportunities of a firm and the leverage for the low growth 
firms. Therefore, an examination of the impact of leverage, 
by recognizing both negative and positive effect of 
leverage, on the equity issuing firm's value change in the 
market at the announcement of such issue should be able to 
shed light on many of the unexplained parts of the previous 
empirical works in this area. Thus, the main contribution 
of this paper is the inclusions of issuing firms leverage in 
the analysis of understanding the stock price behavior of 
new equity issuance announcement.
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D: Seasoned Equity Offerings & Diversification
It is interesting to observe that researchers in the 
past have not recognized the impact of corporate 
diversification on explaining market reaction to seasoned 
equity offerings. The empirical evidence has already 
established that diversification (i.e., corporate structure) 
has direct bearing on the value of a firm. Weston (1970), 
and Williamson (1975) argue that diversified firms are 
capable of forming an internal capital market where the 
internally generated funds can be pooled and allocated in 
the most efficient way. Teece (1980) argues that 
diversification helps firms to achieve the economies of 
scope and the economies of scale. In a very recent work, 
Stein (1997) argues that a diversified firms can efficiently 
distinguish between a good division and a bad division and 
then allocate the resources in the most appropriate way and 
thus enhance the value of the firm.
Lewellen (1971) showed the benefit of coinsurance 
through diversification and found that diversified firms 
have a greater debt capacity then do non-diversified firms. 
Chandler (1977) found that a Multi-divisional firm would be
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able to create specialized divisions and thus benefit from 
the inherent efficiency of task specialization. Stulz 
(1990) argues that diversified firms are capable of reducing 
the underinvestment problem through the creation of a larger 
internal market. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argued that 
conglomerates will have a higher debt capacity because in a 
bad state of the world they can sell assets in those 
industries that suffer from liquidity problem.
Another great advantage of diversification is that 
these firms are expected to have lower tax payments compared 
to the sum of what they would have been paying as separate 
entities. Majd and Myers (1987) mention that taxes are paid 
to the government if the firm's income is positive but does 
not receive a refund if the firm incurs losses. Even with 
the introduction of loss carry forward provisions, the tax 
benefits of diversification have not been eliminated fully.
The arguments from the opponents of diversification are 
getting stronger in the current finance literature. These 
researchers focus their arguments on the cost of 
diversification to the firm. Amihud and Lev (1981) mention 
that managers prefer diversification in order to protect the 
value of their human capital. Based on Jensen (1986)’s free
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'cash flow theory' as well as 'agency theory' researchers 
argue that as managers always benefit from managing larger 
firms. Therefore managers of diversified firms, are more 
likely to indulge themselves in value decreasing investment 
projects (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Based on a similar 
argument Meyer, Milgram, and Robert (1992) argued that a 
failing firm, when standing alone, can not have a value less 
than zero, but under the conglomerate structure, the failing 
firm may have a negative value. The other division (s) 
carrying the failing division(s) will ultimately reduce the 
value of the conglomerate.
The empirical evidence is also very strong against 
diversification. Except for Matsusaka (1993)16 there is 
very little empirical evidence that supports the benefit of 
diversification. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) 
documented that the announcement of unrelated acquisition 
results in a negative market return. Lang and Stulz (1994), 
and Berger and Ofek (1995) have found that diversified firms 
trade in the market at a discount between 13 to 15 percent 
compared to a portfolio of single segment firms in the same
16 Matsusaka(1993) found positive bidder returns at the 
announcement of conglomerate acquisitions in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
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industry17. While examining the sensitivity of cashflows of 
one segment to another, Shin and Stulz (1997) found that the 
cross subsidization among the segments is inefficient.
Myerson(1982), and Harris, Kreiebel, and Raviv(l982) 
examined the information asymmetry cost between central 
management and divisional managers in decentralized firms. 
They concluded that information asymmetry costs are higher 
in conglomerates than in more focused firm, since 
information is more dispersed within the conglomerates.
Thus, they argue that diversified firms are less profitable 
than they would be if their separate lines of business would 
operate independently.
17 A similar finding is also observed for Japanese and UK 
firms(Lins and Servaes, 1997).
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III. THE ISSUES & HYPOTHESES
The empirical and theoretical investigations of equity- 
financing and its impact on the value of the existing stock 
price have concentrated around the two main theories: the 
Information Asymmetry Theory and the Growth Opportunity 
Theory. It is not clear why researchers fail to accommodate 
the issuing firm's leverage level and corporate structure in 
the understanding of the market reaction of the issuing 
firms. The objective of this study is to re-examine the 
effects of seasoned equity issue announcements on the market 
value of such firms from the levered firm's perspective and 
also from the perspective of the corporate structure of the 
issuing firm to understand the impact of such offerings.
A: Leverage, Growth, & Seasoned Equity Offerings
a) The Impacts of Leverage & Seasoned Equity Offerings: 
The term information asymmetry here refers to the inequality
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of information about the firms' assets in place and the 
inequality of information about the net present value of the 
new investment between the managers and existing 
stockholders. The seasoned equity issue event not only 
reflects the fact that the issuing firm is undertaking a new 
investment, but it also alters the issuing firm's existing 
capital structure, (i.e., decreases the leverage ratio). As 
argued before, leverage has a negative association with 
information asymmetry, so an equity issuance will lead to an 
increase in the level of information asymmetry for the 
issuing firm. If the firm is already a high-levered firm, 
the level of information asymmetry of the firm before the 
issue was lower than after the firm issued new equity. 
Therefore, the marginal increase in the level of information 
asymmetry will be higher (lower) for the high-levered (low- 
levered) firm as the firm decreases its leverage level. As 
Dierkens (19 91) concludes, an increase in information 
asymmetry will lead to a more negative valuation effect of 
the high-levered firm's equity issuing decision, thus:
HI: If the information asymmetry impact of
leverage dominates the market reaction to
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seasoned equity offerings, then a High- 
Levered firm should experience greater value 
loss than a Low-levered firm at the 
announcement of a seasoned equity offering.
Leverage of a firm can also effect the future growth 
opportunities of the firm (McConnel and Servaes, 1995), and 
thus effect the announcement day abnormal return of the 
seasoned equity offering. In the finance literature the 
value of a firm is known as the discounted net present value 
of the firms' future investment projects. As leverage 
reduces the capacity of firms to materialize all possible 
investment opportunities the value of the firm must also be 
lower for highly levered firms. As equity financing results 
in the decrease in the leverage ratio, such an action 
increases the opportunity to materialize the future 
investment projects, and thus, such an action should 
increase the value of a highly levered firm at the 
announcement of such issuance.
Moreover, a highly levered firm's decision to issue 
costly equity18 may well be the result of the fact that the
18 Equity issuance is a more complicated process, where, 
under some circumstances managers may need to seek 
permission from the existing equity holders. The process
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project the firm is facing is too good to pass over. And 
due to their high existing level of leverage, the issuing 
firms do not have the choice of using other methods of 
financing. Thus, by issuing equity, a firm increases it's 
debt issuance capacity in order to be able to undertake 
future investment projects. This also decreases the problem 
associated with high leverage (i.e., inability to capitalize 
all future value increasing project). Additionally, the 
firm is also signaling that it is faced with a good 
investment project that can not be passed. Under this 
circumstance, one should expect that such equity financing 
should have a positive market reaction upon issue 
announcement.
If the firm is unlevered19 or low-levered, the marginal 
value of increasing the opportunity to fund future positive 
net present value projects is not as significant as it is 
for the high levered firm. Unlevered or low-levered firms
is also time consuming. Whereas, the debt issuance is 
faster and less complicated. The timing aspect of 
accepting investment project is so important that if 
action is not taken in time then the project becomes 
worthless. This signifies the importance of debt (the 
less time consuming process) capacity in capitalizing 
the future investment project.
19 As assumed in Myers and Majluf(1984).
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do not face the problem of foregoing the investment 
opportunities if equity is not issued. For these firms the 
option to choose low cost financing through debt is 
available. Therefore, for these firms, the inability to 
issue debt should be negatively viewed by the market as 
management's inefficiency in choosing cheaper methods of 
financing, and hence should result in value decreasing 
outcome of such announcement. Thus, leverage of a firms can 
effect the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings 
positively, and this will happen when the growth impacts of 
leverage is dominant. Thus:
H2: If the growth impact of leverage dominates
the market's reaction to seasoned equity 
offering, then High-levered firms should 
experience positive valuation effects at the 
announcement of seasoned equity.
b) The Growth Opportunities & Seasoned Ecruity 
Offerings: Understanding of the leverage impact of growth
would be incomplete without knowing the impacts of growth 
opportunities on the announcement of seasoned equity 
offerings. According to growth (opportunity) theory, if a
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firm possesses the quality of high growth opportunities, 
this implies that the firm has a continuous flow of good 
investment projects. Thus, the value of the firm must be 
higher for high growth firms than the low growth firms.
The theoretical arguments in favor of positive impact 
of growth opportunities on the value of the firms at the 
announcement of equity issuance are very strong (Cooney and 
Kalay, 1993), Jensen (1986)). But unfortunately the 
empirical findings are not that supportive (Barclay and 
Litzenberger (1988), Pilotte (1992), Denis(1994)). Results 
of the study by Denis (1994) documented a non-monotonic 
positive relationship between announcement period prediction 
errors and several ex ante measures of growth opportunities 
by a small sample of younger, higher growth firms.
Ambarish, John, and William (1987), argued that firms listed 
in the New York Stock Exchange and in the American Stock 
Exchange are mostly mature firm (which implies that these 
firm's growth opportunities are limited). Thus, it is 
argued here that the way previous empirical researches have 
defined growth opportunities of a firm may need to be 
adjusted to properly reflect the market view of growth 
opportunities and/or existing growth level of a firm.
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Using information asymmetry argument, in a more recent 
work, McLaughlin, Safieddine, and Vasudevan (1998) has 
documented that firm's with high Tobin's Q has more negative 
reaction to seasoned equity offerings than low Tobin's Q 
firms as high level of growth is associated with high degree 
of information asymmetry (Smith and Watt, 1992). In another 
work Gombala, Lee and Liu (1998) argues that high Tobin's Q 
(high growth opportunity) firms are more over-valued in the 
market than the low Tobin's Q firms. Therefore, market 
reacts more negatively to the issue announcement by the high 
Tobin's Q firms.
It is argued in this paper that other factors imbedded 
in the growth opportunity proxy, i.e., the Tobin's Q, may be 
causing the negative affect. The most probable cause could 
be the fact that a low-growth opportunity firm's decision to 
issue carries more marginal good information than that of 
the high-growth opportunity firms. As a result low-Tobin's 
Q (low-growth opportunity ) firms have less negative impact 
(market reaction) than the high-Tobin's Q (high-growth 
opportunity ) firms. For the low-growth opportunity firms, 
the arrival of good investment projects is not as usual as 
it is for high-growth opportunity firms. Thus, the issue
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announcement, which itself is a good news, creates a 
marginal dominance of good information in favor of low- 
Tobin's Q firms. Hence:
H3 : Firms with high growth opportunity should
experience more value loss at the announcement 
of seasoned equity offering than firms with 
low growth opportunity.
C ) Simultaneous effect of Growth Opportunities & the 
Impacts of Leverage: The subsection (a) of this section
implies that seasoned equity issuing firms existing leverage 
level can effect the market reaction to such issue 
announcements in either negatively (HI) or positively (H2). 
And the subsection (b) argues that the growth opportunities 
of the issuing firm should have negative impact on market's 
reaction to such offering. Therefore to understand the 
combined effect of growth opportunities and the impacts of 
leverage, examination need to be done from two perspective, 
first: where the negative impacts of leverage is dominant, 
i.e., the information asymmetry aspect of seasoned equity 
issue announcement is dominant(HI). Higher the level of
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existing leverage more is the marginal increase in 
information asymmetry due to the equity issuance. For a, 
the high growth opportunity firms, as it is argued before, 
the marginal growth impact from the investment is not that 
of significance. Additionally, as argued by McLaughlin et 
al (1998) the information asymmetry is higher for high 
growth opportunity firms, and the over-valuation of these 
firms are also high (Gombala et al 1998) . Therefore, it is 
most likely that high growth firms with high leverage should 
experience the most value loss at the announcement of such 
offerings. Thus:
H4: If information Asymmetry impact of leverage
(HI) is dominant then high-levered high-growth 
firms should have maximum value loss at the 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings.
Second, from the perspective of growth impact of 
leverage, i.e., firms with high leverage level will have 
more positive growth impact at the announcement of seasoned 
equity offerings. If firms belong to the low growth
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opportunity group, the arrival of a good investment project 
is an unexpected event. In view of that, the effect of 
firms existing leverage level gets more interesting. If 
these low growth opportunity firms have high leverage, then 
an announcement of equity financing reflects several pieces 
of 'news' : (1) the firm has unexpectedly found a positive net 
present value investment project20, and if this project is 
rejected, the arrival of another project is uncertain,* (2) 
by issuing equity, the firm is not only financing a new 
project, it is also creating a provision for future projects 
without equity financing (i.e., increasing the capacity to 
finance future projects at less cost); and (3) for these 
high levered firms the equity issue decision is a foregone 
conclusion, because, due to the existing high leverage 
level, further debt financing is not possible. Equity issue 
is their only way to finance the project. Therefore, the 
marginal cost of forgoing the investment project is 
significantly higher for these firms due to the limited 
growth opportunities. Additionally, the marginal growth
20 Empirical evidence in the finance literature has already 
efficiently documented the impact of good and bad 'news' 
on the value of the firm as well as the markets reaction 
to such 'news'.
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impact of these low growth opportunity firms are more 
positive The market, thus, will react positively (or less 
negatively) to the announcement of seasoned equity offering 
for these low-growth opportunity high levered firms. Thus:
H5: If growth impact of leverage (H2) is dominant the
high-levered low-growth firms should experience 
the least value loss at the announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings.
B: Corporate Structure & Seasoned Equity Offerings
Researchers have established that diversification 
increases the asymmetry of information between the managers 
and shareholders about the value of the firm (Myerson 
(1982) , Harris, Kreiebel, and Raviv (1982) ) . They argue 
that increased diversity makes it difficult for the 
shareholders to get all the information about the firm as 
efficiently as the managers of the firms.
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Apart from the information asymmetry issue there are 
other factors that also contribute negatively to the value 
of a diversified firm. Jensen (1986), Amihud and Lev (1981) 
and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) have documented 
empirical evidence in support of the 'free cash flow' theory 
arguing that managers prefer diversification in order to 
protect their human capital. In 1989, Shleifer and Vishny 
found evidence to support the argument that managers 
diversify, because through diversification they are capable 
of making their skills more indispensable to the firm.
Proponents of diversification have argued that 
diversification helps firm to raise capital at a lower cost. 
As these diversified firms have debt capacities that are 
higher than the non-diversified or focused firm (Lewellen, 
1977), market is surprised to see that these firms are 
issuing equity instead of debt to finance investment 
project. Such action of a firm increases its' 'over­
investment problem' and /or problem associated with the 
inefficiency of management. Empirical evidences have 
already established that equity issuance is a costly action 
as well as a value decreasing event, when there is debt 
capacity available the issuance of equity is certainly a bad
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news. On the other hand, if the firm has already exhausted 
its debt capacity, then the possibility of over-investment 
becomes a concern to the outside investors. In either cases 
one should expect that the market reaction to seasoned 
equity offering will always be negative for a diversified 
firm. Thus:
H 6 : Diversified firms issuing seasoned equity
should experience a more negative reaction at 
the announcement of such issuance when 
compared with non-diversified firms.
The discussion on the issue of corporate structure and 
its impact on the seasoned equity issue announcements would 
be incomplete if the discussion does not cover the impact of 
the market's knowledge about the issuing firms past 
structural change, i.e., changes in the focus or 
diversification level. The most relevant structural change 
in this context are the reduction of existing lines of 
business through the selling of existing segments in order 
to increase the focus, and/ or the acquisition of new 
segments to widen the corporate diversity and hence 
reducing focus.
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Recent empirical work in this area has documented that 
increasing focus is associated with increase in the value of 
the firm (Berger and Ofek (1995), John and Ofek (1995) 
Comment and Jarrell (1995)). This positive effect is due to 
the markets understanding that these firms are now (after 
selling of segments) capable of managing the corporation 
more efficiently than before.
In this paper it is argued that in addition to the 
arguments suggested in the literature, there are other 
factors that also contribute to the positive association to 
such focus increasing activity to the value of the firm. 
These firms, after taking divestiture action, have more 
assets in place to invest in future net present value 
projects than before, thus, are capable of maximizing their 
value through not passing over good investment projects. 
Therefore, it is very likely that these firms should gain 
value in the market, as long as market value of a firm is 
based on the discounted present value of the future 
investment projects attainable to the firm.
But when these firms decide to go to the market in the 
subsequent years of focus increasing activity, the market 
becomes suspicious about the activity of the management and
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also becomes skeptical about the presence of positive net 
present value in their future projects. Additionally, it 
remains unclear why these firms are issuing equity, even if 
they have good investment projects. If they have used the 
funds collected from the sale of assets to pay off debts 
then they should have debt capacity outstanding. If they 
have not used up their funds, then they should have 
outstanding cashflow, which should be used to finance the 
new investment rather than issuing equity. The market will 
not become suspicious only when the firm has already spent 
the funds on investments and now there is a genuine need for 
new investment capital. Thus:
H7 : If the seasoned equity issuing firm has
increased it's focus in the recent past, then
the amount of negative effect of such
issuance will be the largest.
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IV. DATA & METHODOLOGY
A. DATA
The seasoned equity offerings from 1983 through the end 
of 1994 were hand collected from the bi-annual publication 
Investment Dealer’s Digest21. The data collected from the 
above source includes: the offering date, the offering 
price, and the number of shares offered. The financial year 
end date for each firm was collected from the Wall Street 
Journal Index (WSJI)22. These dates are then cross checked 
with the WSJI.23. If the issue is reported in the WSJI and 
has a different offering date then the event date is changed 
to the date reported in the WSJI minus one.
21 Until first half of 1988 the publication was called as 
"the Directory of Corporate Financing" and from the 
second half of 1988 it is known as "The Corporate 
Financing" .
22 Financial yearend dates are needed to align the financial 
data from the Compustat, and to determine in which 
financial year the particular issue is made.
23 It is important here to mention that the Wall Street 
Journal Index does not report issue announcements as 
often as it used to do until the first half of 80's.
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The WSJI generally reports different dates for an 
offerings. These dates are: The date of plan to offer; date 
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC); The offering date; The offering completion date; and 
offering withdrawal date. The offering date collected from 
the primary source (publication of Investment Dealers 
Digest) is used as the base24 date.
Initially, 4876 issue events were identified with the 
criteria that the issue must be either a pure primary 
seasoned issue (henceforth Seasoned Issue) or a combination 
of primary and secondary seasoned issue (henceforth called 
Combined Issue) offered at the same date. An issue is 
called 'seasoned' if the issue is not an initial public 
offering. Secondary issues are issues where existing block 
stockholders sell significant portions of their holdings in 
the open market25.
24 The reason it is called as base date is because paper do 
not intend to include dates other than Offering 
announcements in the event window. It is found in the 
Wall Street Journal Index that there are cases where a 
plan to offer came two months, three months even six 
months earlier, or registration for the offering was done 
as early as three months earlier than the actual 
offering. It is also found that some of the reported 
offer completion date is well after the initial offering 
announcement.
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The following criteria were set for each event to be a 
part of the sample for the reasons described below:
a: For the financial data, Compustat Annual data tape 
of 1996 (hereinafter, Compustat) is used. If the sample 
firm is not in the data tape then events related to that 
companies are deleted from the sample.
b: For market data, the daily return data tape of the 
Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP) for period 
ending December 31, 1996 is used. Abnormal return 
calculation methodology requires that each sample event must 
have return data for -187 days from event date up to +15 
days from event date. Sample events failing to meet these 
criteria were also dropped from the sample.
C: In order to avoid the confounding effect, those 
sample events were deleted which have seasoned or combined 
issues within the past 12 months or within the subsequent 12 
months26of the event date. In case of firms making multiple
25 Those combined offerings are dropped where the secondary 
offering were not registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, because unregistered offerings are 
expected to have different market impacts than registered 
ones.
26 It is important here to recognize certain facts about the 
Compustat annual data tape. First, Data tape do not 
report the financial year end date for the reporting
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issues within the event period (1983 through 1994)27 the 
earliest event is first considered provided there is no 
seasoned or combined offering in the past 12 months of such 
offering. For a second event to be considered in the sample 
from the same company the event must be at least 12 months 
apart from the first offering provided no similar offering 
took place within the subsequent 12 month period.
d: To avoid possible information contamination around 
the sample event date from offerings other than seasoned or 
combined offerings (such as offering of debt, convertibles 
etc.) sample events were also eliminated where such events
companies, rather it only reports the month of the 
financial year end. Second, Reporting year in the 
Compustat is not same as financial year end (for more 
detail please refer to Compustat User guide). Telephone 
discussion with Compustat revels that when a company/firm 
change its financial reporting date, the financial data 
reported in the Compustat does not reflect the annual 
financial data for the surrounding years of such change. 
Examination of several firms confirms the limitation. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the chance of using non­
annual data for cross sectional analysis sample firm and 
associated events were dropped if the firm has changed 
its reporting date within the sample period.
27 The event period for the study is 1982 through 1995, 
because each of the surviving sample firms fits the 
criteria that no sample has similar event one year prior 
or one year after the first event.
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(such as offering of debt, convertibles etc.) were present 
within 3 0 days surrounding the sample event date.
e: Also deleted were those events associated with firms 
which were not listed in the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
or in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)or in the NASDAQ 
Market System (NASDAQ)28.
The above selection criteria brought the sample down to 
1353 sample events for 984 companies over a period of 12 
years (1983 to 1994) . Table 1 shows the sample collection 
and elimination process.
[ Insert Table 1 about here ]
Table 2 shows the distribution of sample events and 
sample firms by event year and by exchange listing, and also 
by event year and by the Industry29. A total of 807 sample
28 For exchange classification, Compustat data item 
"Exchange Listing and S&P Major Index Code" (If the 
Compustat exchange listing codes(ZLIST) are 01, 02, 03,
04, and 10 then firms are from New York Stock Exchange; 
if codes are 05, 15, 16, 17, and 18 then firms are from 
American Stock Exchange; and if codes are 21, 22, 23, 24, 
and 25 then firms are from NASDAQ National Market 
System.) was used.
29 In defining industry we used Compustat supplied Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) code. If the first two
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events from 570 firms are from the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), 108 (76 sample firms) and 438 (338 sample firms) 
sample events were from the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
and the NASDAQ Market System (NASDAQ) respectively. For 
1353 sample events, 926 (715 sample firms) events belong to 
the Industrial category and 236 (164 sample firms) events 
are from the Financial and Banking category. The balance of 
191 sample events (105 sample firms) belong to the Utilities 
group.
[ Insert Table 2 about here ]
Sample events are grouped by the number of times the 
issuer completed the issue with in the sample period
(hereinafter, Multiplicity of the Issue). If the issuer
issued more than one issue, then the issue is identified as
'multiple' issue and those who issued once in the sample
digits of the SIC code is 49 then we classify the firm as 
Utilities, if the first two digits are between 60 and 69 
(both inclusive) then the firms are Financial and Banking, 
and all others are classified as Industrial (Slovin, 
Sushka, and Polonchek, 1992). Appendix A contains the 
distribution of sample events by the Two-digit Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) code for both total sample 
and Segment sample.
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period are called 'single' issue. The justification for 
this type of classification is that multiple issuers are 
known to the market and the level of information asymmetry 
about the firms value between the investors(market} and the 
firms(managers)is much less than that of the single issuers, 
who came to market for the first time. It is expected that 
the negative reaction to seasoned offerings will be 
significantly less for the multiple issuers than the single 
issuers. On the contrary, Thakor(1993) developed a model 
based on information asymmetry and argues that the negative 
reaction to equity issuance, in magnitude, increases with 
the increase in the frequency of prior equity issuance, 
i.e., price reaction to cash stock piling is negative.
There are 753 sample events belongs to the single 
issuer, of which 572 from the industrial sample, 12 9 events 
from banks and 52 from utilities(table 3). Out of 600 
multiple issue events 3 54 events are from industrial group, 
107 events from the banks and 139 events from utilities. 
Interesting to notice that the proportion of multiple issue 
is much greater for utilities than any other group.
[ Insert Table 3 about here ]
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
4 6
Samples were also grouped by the type of the issue: if 
the primary seasoned equity issue is associated with a 
secondary issue then those are identified as 'combined' 
issue and if not then those are identified as 'primary' 
issue. It is argued in the literature that secondary 
offerings are associated with negative market reaction 
(Johnson, Serrano, and Thompson (1996)), therefore, it is 
expected that combined issue events should result in more
negative reaction than the primary issue. Out of the total
sample events, 970 of the events were Primary issues and 383 
events were Combined issues (Table 3). Combined issue 
events for Financial and Utilities were relatively fewer 
then Industrial firms. The total number of Primary issue 
events for the Industrial group is 58 9 events and the same
for the bank and utilities are 202 and 179 events
respectively. The number of Primary issue event is more 
than the combined issue events in all sub-groups.
Table 4 contains the descriptive statistics of the 
overall sample events showing the mean and the median.
Other variables included in the tables are: properties of 
issue events such as, issue price, issue size adjusted by
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the market value of the assets, leverage of the issuing 
firm, firms' growth measures such are Tobin's Q, 1-year and 
3-year growth in return on sales, and the firms measures of 
performances, like, return on sales (ROS) , return on Assets 
(ROA). Other variable includes in the table are market 
value of assets, and cash flow to total assets.
[ Insert Table 4 about here ]
In order to analyze the impact of diversification on 
the market value of seasoned equity offerings firm 
additional data have been collected from the Compust.at 
PCPLUS for 199630 . From this source two sets of data is 
gathered to identify the level of diversification of the 
sample firms. Collected data are: four-digit SIC (Standard 
Industry Classification) code and the reported sales by the 
each four-digit SIC code. It is important here to mention 
that Compustat only carry segment data for past seven years. 
Therefore, analysis in this regard is restricted between 
1989 and 1994. Due to this limitation 794 sample events
30 Author gratefully thanks the business library of College 
of William and Mary for their generosity in letting him 
use their data source.
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were lost. Additional 9 sample events were also lost due to 
non availability of segment information for the last year31 
of the seasoned equity issuing firms. Thus, the final 
number of sample events for analyzing the impact of 
diversification drops to 550 sample events32.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the distribution of segment 
sample events as they are grouped by the multiplicity of the 
issue (i.e., single and multiple) and by the type of the 
issue(i.e., Primary and Combined) in different exchanges. 
Panel B contains the same information for different industry 
categories. Out of total 550 sample events, 382 events were 
Primary issues, and 168 events were Combined issues, and 3 05 
sample events were Single events, and 245 were Multiple 
events. The total number of Primary issue events for 
Industrial group is 244 events and the total number of 
single issue events is 227 events. The number of single 
events surpass multiple events in all categories, similarly,
31 The term 'last year' refers to that financial year which
is immediately preceding the event date, and where the
issue event is NOT included in the financial data.
32 op. cit. Table 1.
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the number of Primary issue events is more than the Combined 
issue events in all sub-groups33.
[ Insert Table 5 about here ]
Table 6 reported below contains the descriptive 
statistics of the primary variables for the last year used 
in the segment sample events.
[ Insert Table 6 about here ]
B. METHODOLOGY
a) Event Study:
Figure 1 represent how the daily returns are used in 
calculating the estimated of normal returns and excess 
return for each sample event. The event day is the day 0 in 
the event time. The estimation period is t = -162 to -36
33 This is due to the sample selection process used in this 
study, where similar issue events within one year of 
event day is dropped.
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relative to the event date( day 0) is used to calculate 
(estimated) the normal return of the event window, which is
a 31 day period (-15 through +15 relative to event day).
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
The market model is used to estimate normal or expected 
returns of the common stocks of the sample events. In this 
ordinary least squares model, returns on a given security 
are regressed against the concurrent returns of the market. 
The Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) equally 
weighted index is used as a proxy for the market Portfolio.
Rj t  = + Pj^rnt + ^ j t
Where,
t = day measured relative to the event,
RjC = return on security j on day t,
Rmt = daily equally-weighted index for all common
stocks on NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ firms on the
CRSP tape on the event date t (a proxy for the
market portfolio of the risky assets)
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ctj = estimated period intercept of firm j
Pj = Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates34 of firm
j 's market model parameters.
Ejt = the error term of security j on the sample event 
day t
The abnormal returns for the sample event is the
difference between the actual returns on its common stock
and the contemporaneous expected return generated by the 
market model. The abnormal returns(AR) for each sample 
event j on day t is obtained as follows:
= ~ C®j “ Pĵ mt )
Where
t = day measured relative to the event,
ARjt = excess return to security j for day t,
Rjc = return on security j during day t,
34 Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) has maintain that the above 
methodology may create a potential for bias of the 
Ordinary Least Square(OLS) estimate Pj, due to 
nonsynchronous trading and infrequent trading in the 
estimation period. In order to correct such biases 
Scholes and William (1977) suggested methodology is 
adopted to calculate the OLS estimate Pj
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R ^  = daily equally-weighted index for all
common stocks on NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ firms 
on the CRSP tape on the event date t (a proxy 
for the market portfolio of the risky assets)
ctj = estimated intercept of firm j
Pj = OLS estimates of firm j's market model
parameters.
Daily abnormal or excess returns are calculated for 
each sample event in the study over the event window. For a
sample of N sample event, the daily average abnormal return
for each day t is estimated as
N
ARt = XAR jt/N
7-1
The expected value of ARjt. is zero by definition.
Analysis of statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns calculated above requires the standardization of 
abnormal return to reflect statistical errors in the 
determination of expected returns. To determine whether the
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average daily abnormal return is statistically significantly 
different from zero, the average standardized abnormal 
return(ASARt) is calculated as









S = Standard error of the forecast for security j
in period t in the event period;
= The residual variance for security j from the
market model regression;
N = The number of observations in the estimation 
period;
i?m = The average return of market portfolio for the
estimation period
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/?„, = The returns on the market portfolio for the
day t
R„, = The market return for period j within the
estimation period;
T = Number of periods employed in the regression
equation for parameter estimation (126 days).
T = Number of periods in the event window/period
(31 days).
I = Sub-script for estimation period.
J = Sub-script for the event window/period.
Assuming the normality and the independence of the 
distribution of the calculated abnormal returns the t- 
statistics of the estimated parameters were calculated for 
each days as:
t =  yjN(ASARi)
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each security 
j , CARj, is calculated by summing average abnormal returns 
over the event period as follows:
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C-AR, K L — ̂  ARjt
i=K
Where the CARj>K>L is for the period from t = day K 
until t = day L.
The cumulative average abnormal returns(GAAR) over the 
event time period from day K to day L are calculated as
CAARk l — j] CARj'KL 
M 1
Then average of the above standardized cumulative 
abnormal return over the interval K to L are obtained as 
follows:
a^a-  An V” ASARk , ASCARK, = Y  .
KX Y J K - L  + l
Finally, the t-statistics for the average standardized 
cumulative abnormal return were calculated using the 
following formula:
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t( ASCARK l) =  yjN(ASCARK L)
For the purpose of this analysis the only Cumulative 
abnormal returns were calculated for three days around event 
day by summing the abnormal returns of event day minus one 
day, event day, and event day plus one day, and is called 
CAR-i.+i* It: observed in the preliminary examination of
abnormal returns of the sample events that abnormal returns 
around the three days of event day is consistently 
significant in all the sub-groups of the sample35.
b) Cross Sectional Regression Analysis:
A cross sectional analysis was employed in the study to 
identify the relationship between the identified variable 
with the dependent variable. The dependent variables are 
CAR0 0 and CAR_1>+1 and the main independent variables are: 
Tobin's Q as a measures of growth opportunities, leverage 
ratio, market value of assets, cashflow to total assets,
35 5-days cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated to 
get some additional insight of the results.
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size of the issue adjusted by the market value of the 
assets, and dummies for the sub-group of sample. In the 
segment sample additional independent variable Herfindahl 
index and dummies for the focus level (High-focused vs. Low 
focused) and focus activity (Increase focus vs. Decreased 
focus) are used.
i) Tobin's O - Calculation & Its Use
In order to perform the cross sectional analysis, this 
study requires the understanding of firms' investment 
opportunities and its relation to Tobin's Q. Tobin's Q has 
been defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to 
the replacement costs of its assets. James Tobin (1969) 
introduced this ratio in order to examine the causal 
relationship between Tobin's Q and investment. He argues 
that if, at the margin, Tobin's Q exceeded unity, firms 
would have incentive to invest, since the value of their new 
capital investment would exceed its cost. It is clear that 
if all such investment opportunities were exploited, the 
marginal value of Tobin's Q should tend toward unity.
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In the finance literature Tobin's Q has been used to 
represent a number of diverse corporate phenomena, such as, 
cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities and 
diversification decisions (Malkiel, Von Furstenberg, and 
Watson (1979)); the relationship between managerial equity 
ownership and firm value (McConnel and Servaes,(1990 and 
1995)) ; and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1988)) ; the 
relationship between managerial performance and tender offer 
gains (Lang, Stulz, and Walking(1989)); investment 
opportunities and tender offer responses (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walking, (1989) ) ,- and financing, dividend, and Compensation 
policies (Smith and Watts, (1992)) .
In this paper Tobin's Q is using to distinguish between 
firms that have positive Net Present Value investment 
opportunities and those that who do not. High Tobin's Q 
firms are those who possess positive investment project at 
the time making seasoned equity offering and low Tobin's Q 
firms are those who do not possess such opportunities.
The calculation of Tobin's Q as suggested by Tobin's is 
practically impossible for the samples used in this studies, 
due to non availability of replacement cost estimated for 
the sample period. The procedure used by Lindenberg and
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Ross (1981), hereinafter, L-R to estimate Tobin's Q is very 
complicated in terms of computational efforts and data 
availability. Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a simple 
formula to approximate L-R's estimate of Tobin's Q.
Approximate Tobin's Q = (MVA + PS + DEBT)/TA
where
MVA36 = Product of a firm's share price and the number 
of common stock outstanding 
PS= = Liquidating value of firm's outstanding
preferred stock37 
DEBT38 = Short-term liabilities net of short term
assets plus the book value of the firm's long­
term debt.
TA39 = Book value of the total assets of the firm.
36 Product of Compustat date item #25 and data Item #199.
37 Compustat Data Item #10
38 Sum of Compustat data Item #5 and #9 minus data Item #4.
39 Compustat Data Item #6.
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The main advantage of Chung and Pruitt's method is that 
(a) all data needed to calculate Tobin's Q is readily 
available in the Compustat database, and (b) this method is 
capable of explaining 96.9% of the variability of the L-R's 
method of approximating Tobin's Q. For the purpose of this 
paper thus, Chung and Pruitt's approximation is used.
Firm's leverage ratio is defined as the book value of 
current liability plus long-term debt divided by the sum of 
the book value of current and long-term debt, market value 
of common stock, and liquidating value of preferred stock 
(Pilotte, 1992). Appendix B contains the details of the 
calculation of different variables to be used in the study.
Calculated Tobin's Q is then adjusted by using the 
industry and exchange controlled median40 Tobin's Q in order 
to group the sample by Q ratio. The same step is taken for 
grouping the samples by the leverage ratio41,42. Event year
40 In calculating industry and exchange controlled median we 
used all available companies in the Compustat data base 
for 1996.
41 This papers' unique industry and exchange median is 
motivated by the fact that finance researchers have 
already recognized the structural and size differences 
among the firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange, 
the American Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ market system 
(Ambarish, John, and William, 1987).
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is defined as the financial year within which firm made the 
equity issue announcement. For the purpose of the study the 
'last year'43 (i.e., the year before the event year) is the 
relevant year. Because, this is the year where the issue 
event's impacts on accounting numbers are not incorporated. 
In other words, the grouping of the samples are made based 
on last year's Tobin's Q, and /or leverage ratio.
ii) Herfindahl Index - Calculation & Its Use
Net sales44 based Herfindahl index45 (HI) is used in 
this study to measure the level of focus /diversification of
42 Industry and Exchange median adjusted Tobin's Q, book-to- 
market or leverage ratio is calculated by subtracting the 
industry and exchange adjusted median value of the 
respective variable from the actual value for the firm, 
e.g., adjusted Tobin's Q of firm X is calculated as 
Tobin's Q of X for year t minus industry and exchange 
adjusted median Tobin's Q for the year t.
43 op. cit. Footnote #32.
44 This item represents gross sales(the amount of actual 
billings to customers for regular sales completed 
during the period) reduced by cash discounts, trade 
discounts, and returned sales and allowances for which 
credit is given to customers, for each industry segment. 
For more details please refer to Compustat user's manual.
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the issuing firms. Net sales are reported in Compustat 
(PCPLUS) for each segment only if the segment sale is at 
least 10% of the total sales. A net sales based Herfindahl 
index reflects the degree to which revenues are concentrated 
in just a few of a company's business segment, and 
calculated across n business segments as the sum of squares 
of each segment i's sales, Si, as a proportion of total 
sales:
hc = ! - ! . ! (  s ic / z Blml s ic )2
Where Ht takes values between zero and one. The closer 
Ht is to one, the more concentrated are the firm's sales 
within a few segments, and hence the more focused its 
operations. High focused firms are those which have Ht in 
the event year greater than the industry adjusted median 
Herfindahl index, and rest are called low focused or 
diversified firms.
4S Compustat only reports sales based on four-digit SIC,
therefore, our calculation of Herfindahl index is a four­
digit SIC code classification based measure.
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Table 7 (panel A) shows the distribution of segment 
samples by exchange listing and industry classification and 
by the level of diversification - high-focused and low- 
focused. Panel B contains the grouping the segment samples 
by the diversification/focus activity of the sample events 
over the last three years. If the firms has increased focus 
in the past two year over the preceding year then those are 
identified as focus-increased firms, on the other hand, if 
the firms has decreased the focus successively over the last 
two year then those are identified as focus-decreased firms. 
Sample does not fall into this categories are dropped from 
the sample to facilitate a better comparison between the 
market reaction to seasoned equity offering by the group in 
this sub-section of the study.
[ Insert Table 7 about here ]
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A; Analysis of Abnormal Returns
Table 8 contains the average abnormal returns on the 
event date (CAR00), cumulative abnormal return for 3-days 
around the event-date (CAR.lrl) , and cumulative abnormal 
returns for 5-days around the event date (CAR_22) along with 
their respective t-statistics. In the overall sample it is 
found that the average abnormal return for the event day is 
-0.8416% (t=-ll.8163). The cumulative abnormal returns for 
the 3-days around the event day(-l thorough +1) is -2.1626% 
(t=-l.93871) and for the 5-days around the event day(-2 
thorough +2) is 2.4328% (-1.70849). Previous empirical work 
has reported that the average two-day abnormal return for 
seasoned equity offerings around the event date is about - 
3.1% for Industrial firms46. Event day and cumulative 
abnormal returns observed in this study are lower than what
Source: Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhler
(1985), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Parch
(1986), Schipper and Smith (1986).
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is reported in previous empirical works. The most plausible 
reason is that the sample period covered in this paper is 
different from other empirical works. Additionally, this 
paper's sample filtration to isolate the impacts of 
individual seasoned equity offerings from other seasoned 
equity offering as well other related offerings may have 
caused the lower event day abnormal return and 3-days 
cumulative abnormal returns around the event date47 as 
compared to what is found in previous work.
[ Insert Table 8 about here]
The reported t-statistics on table 8 are highly 
significant for all categories. Table 8 also reports the 
percentage of positive returns on the event date. These 
numbers are relatively high when compared with those 
reported occasionally by previous researchers in this area. 
The percentage of positive response on the event day for the
47 To the best of the authors knowledge no other empirical 
has done this much extensive filtration to select the 
individual seasoned equity offerings
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overall sample is 34.885%48. The same percentages from 
previous empirical works ranged between 19% and 27% for 
industrial firms. The apparent reason is that due to more 
stringent filtration, some higher negative abnormal return 
producing sample events may have been dropped out from this 
study.
The table also contains the breakdown of the abnormal 
returns by the type of industry. The event-day and 3-days 
cumulative abnormal returns for the industrial firms are - 
0.97866% (t=-9.6227). and -2.49151% (t=-14.4787434) 
respectively49.
When the sample is grouped by the exchange listing of 
the events it is found that samples listed in the American 
Stock Exchange(AMEX) and NASDAQ market system have more 
negative abnormal returns at the announcement of seasoned 
equity offerings when compared with the issues listed in the
48 The percentage for Banks is 41.949%, for Industrial firms 
the percentage is 33.153%, and for Utilities the 
percentage is 34.5b5%.
49 For the Banks the event-day and 3-days cumulative 
abnormal returns are -0.61584%(-4.223236) and -1.74887% 
(t=-7.0944853), and for the Utilities are -0 .45605%(t=- 
3.87064) and -1.0793% (t=-5.33169668) respectively. The 
findings of relatively lower abnormal returns for Banks 
and Utilities are consistent with the empirical findings 
of Polonchek, Slovin and Sushka (198 9)
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New York Stock Exchange(NYSE). This finding does not 
support the argument placed by Ambarish, John, and 
William(1988), that issues listed in the AMEX and in NYSE 
are mostly mature firms and should experience more value 
loss than the firms listed in the NASDAQ market system as 
firms listed in the later are mostly rapidly growing firms. 
The finding of a greater negative market reaction for the 
firms listed in the NASDAQ system indicates that there are 
other factors beyond growth opportunities which are 
contributing toward the market reaction to such offerings50.
It is expected in this paper that the multiple issuers 
should experience less negative effects as the market has 
better information about the issuers. Investors in the 
multiple issue events are less uncertainties about the 
company and its activities as compared to the investor in 
single/ first time issues. Analysis in this paper shows 
that the mean abnormal return difference between multiple 
issuers and single issuers is not statistically 
significant51. But the magnitudes of the results are in the
50 A similar conclusion is drawn by Denis(1994).
51 Important to report that individual groups event day 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at all 
c onvent i ona1 1eve1.
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same direction of earlier argument, i.e., the market favors 
experienced firms but not at any significant level at least 
for the overall sample. These findings remain consistent 
among industrial classification as well as categories of 
exchange listing.
T-test results (not reported in the above table) also 
indicate that if the issue event is associated with a 
secondary issue on the event date (i.e., combined issues), 
then the issue causes significantly greater value loss to 
the firm than if the issue had been made independently 
(i.e., primary issues). When a primary issue is associated 
with a secondary issue that implies that the block holders 
of the stock are also selling their stocks while the company 
itself is trying to sell more stocks in the market.
Negative pressures are coming from two forces: (1) more
stocks are available in market - an over-supply of stocks; 
and (2) blockholders(who are generally believed to have 
inside information) intentions to sell their stock could 
bear a negative news about the issue as well as about the 
firm. When the results were examined by the industry 
classification and exchange listing of the issue, it is 
found that the mean abnormal return difference between the
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primary and combined issue is statistically significant for 
the industrial samples and also for the firms listed in the 
NASDAQ market system. Thus the conclusion is drawn that in 
determining a NASDAQ listed industrial firm's market 
reaction to seasoned equity offering, the type of the issue 
is an important determinant. The market reaction for a 
combined issue is significantly more negative than that of 
the primary issue.
a) Abnormal Return & the Impacts of Leverage
In order to test hypothesis one (HI) and hypothesis two 
(H2), developed earlier in this paper, sample events were 
classified by the level of issuing firms existing leverage 
level (Table 9). If the issuing firms leverage on the last 
year (i.e., the year before the issue event took place) is 
greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median 
(calculated using all the available firms in the Compustat 
database) than the firms were considered to be high-levered 
firms. The remaining firms are classified low-levered firms. 
Out of 1353 sample events, 687 sample were identified as
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high-levered issue events and the rest (666 event) as low- 
levered events. The event-day abnormal returns for the two 
group were -0.779306% and -0.901994% for high-levered firms 
and low-levered firms respectively. The mean abnormal 
return differences between the two group is not 
statistically significant. The mean leverage level (not 
reported in the table) for the two groups was 0.137298 for 
the low-levered group and 0.397949 for the high-levered 
group, the differences between the mean of leverage ratio is 
statistically significant. These results fail to support 
hypothesis one(HI), i.e., that high-levered firms lose more 
value at the announcement of a seasoned equity offering. On 
the other hand, the support for hypothesis two(H2) is not 
statistically significant. This implies that the results do 
not show that the market's reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings of high-levered firm is better than the low- 
levered firm.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
The sample events are then examined by the industry 
classification and also by the exchange listing of the issue
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event. There are no significant differences between low- 
levered firms and high-levered firms among any of the sub­
groupings by industry classification or by exchange listing. 
Even when the sample events were grouped by the type of the 
issue and by the multiplicity of the issue, results also do 
not reveal any significant differences. Although the mean 
abnormal return differences are not statistically 
significant, the results in the table 9 reveal that in 
general high-levered firms are performing better than low- 
levered firms, thus shows sign for favoring the growth 
impact arguments of leverage as outline in hypothesis two 
(H2) 52,53 .
For the Industrial sample events it is observed that 
exchange listing is not a factor that contributes toward the 
differences in abnormal return between the high-levered and 
low-levered firms, neither does the types of the issue or
52 Out of the ten(10) different groupings of sample events 
seven(7) groups supports in favor of hypothesis two, 
i.e., growth argument and the rest 3 (three) group 
supports hypothesis one, i.e., information asymmetry 
argument on the event-day abnormal return.
53 Therefore, it is warranted that the growth impact of 
leverage need to be addressed along with the growth 
opportunity argument to understand the impacts of 
leverage and Tobin's Q in market's reaction to seasoned 
equity offerings
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the multiplicity of the issue (Table 10) . Also observed in 
table 10 that in the overall sample, events listed in NYSE 
and AMEX the dominance of information asymmetry impact of 
leverage is visible, i.e., high-levered firms lose more 
value at the issue announcement due to the high marginal 
increase in information asymmetry (HI). Whereas, issues 
listed in NASDAQ shows less negative abnormal returns for 
high-levered firms, which supports the growth impact of 
leverage hypothesis (H2) . Thus the results supports the 
view of Ambarish, John, and William (1987) ' s that the 
announcement effect for the firms listed in the NASDAQ 
market, which are mostly growing firms, should be a function 
of growth.54. Results show support for both hypotheses (HI 
and H2) for different sub-categories of sample event.
Whether the information asymmetry impact of leverage or the 
growth impact of leverage is dominant depends on the issue 
characteristics of the event.
[ Insert Table 10 about here ]
54 Result remains consistent when 3-days cumulative abnormal 
returns were used in the analysis.
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Results in Table 10 indicate that firms listed on the 
NYSE carried significantly different abnormal returns with 
the announcement of seasoned equity offerings between low- 
levered firms and high-levered firms when sample are further 
classified between the single issues and multiple issues.
It affirms the argument that for multiple issuers, the 
market is already aware of the firms growth and growth 
related information through past experience, so the 
uncertainty about the issue event become the dominating 
force in controlling the announcement effect. Thus, results 
support the information asymmetry impact of leverage 
hypothesis (HI). For the single issuers the story is 
different, the market does not know much about the firm's 
growth related opportunities of the firms as well as that of 
the event itself. Therefore, the growth impact of leverage 
becomes the dominating force, and as observed in this study, 
high-levered firm's market reactions is less than the low- 
levered firm for these samples, and hence supports the 
hypothesis (H2). It is important to note that in both cases 
the abnormal return differences between high-levered and 
low-levered firms are statistically significant. Thus, the 
findings supports both hypotheses (HI and H2) and also
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recognizes the fact that the market's reaction to seasoned 
equity offerings depends upon the nature of the issue.
b) Abnormal. Returns & Growth Opportunities
Like most of the previous empirical works, growth in 
this paper is measured by calculating Tobin's Q. Although 
this study uses an abridged version of original Tobin's Q 
due to lack of data, the descriptive statistics of Tobin's Q 
shows that the calculated Tobin's Q used in this study is 
very similar to what has been used in other empirical works. 
The descriptive statistics of the Tobin's is listed in table 
11. It is observed that mean and median Tobin's Q for the 
overall sample and for all of the categories are very high. 
This implies that issuing firms are firms with ample growth 
opportunities. To isolate the relatively high-growth 
opportunity firms from the relatively low-growth opportunity 
firms this paper used a more restrictive growth 
classification. In this paper high growth opportunity firms 
are those which have Tobin's Q greater than one, as well as 
a Tobin's Q greater than the industry and exchange-adjusted
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median Tobin's Q. This classification produces a mean 
Tobin's Q for low growth opportunity firms of 0.590849, and 
that for the high growth opportunity firms of 2.292758.
[ Insert Table 11 about here ]
Theoretical arguments suggest that a high-growth firm's 
growth opportunities minimize the value loss associated with 
the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. However, 
empirical studies on seasoned equity offerings shows little 
evidence that high growth firms benefit from seasoned equity 
offerings. Table 12 contains the results of event day 
abnormal returns of the sample events grouped by high-growth 
opportunity firms and low-growth opportunity firms. Results 
indicate that there are significant differences between 
high-growth and low-growth firms in event-day and 3-days 
cumulative abnormal returns for the overall sample. But 
most importantly is the result that high-growth opportunity 
firms' market reaction to seasoned equity offerings is 
significantly more negative than that for the low-growth 
opportunity firms. The results are consistent even when the 
samples are regrouped by the industry, or by the exchange
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listing of the events, or by the type of the issue, or by 
the multiplicity of the issue. Thus, the overall results 
supports the marginal growth impact argument (H3) developed 
earlier in this paper.
[ Insert Table 12 about here ]
Table 12 also shows that a higher level of significance 
in mean difference between abnormal returns between for 
different growth opportunity levels exists in the sample 
group of industrial firms, firms listed in the NASDAQ 
market, in the combined samples and in the sample consists 
of single issuers. Other sample groups also show a similar 
pattern i.e., high-growth opportunity firms losing more 
value than the low-growth opportunity firms, but the results 
are not statistically significant. Results are also 
consistent in 3-days and 5-days cumulative abnormal return 
except for the NYSE listed samples in 3-days cumulative 
abnormal return. These findings are in sharp contrast to 
the popular belief that growth opportunities plays a 
positive role in determining the announcement effect of
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seasoned equity offerings, but overwhelmingly supports the 
validity of hypothesis H3.
In order to explain the inconsistency of this paper's 
findings with the previous empirical work it can be argued 
that in a seasoned equity offering it may not be the growth 
opportunities that is controlling the announcement 
effects55. It is argued in this paper that other factors 
imbedded in the growth opportunity proxy, i.e., the Tobin's 
Q, may be causing the negative affect. It is likely that a 
low-growth opportunity firm's decision to issue carries a 
stronger positive marginal effect than that of the high- 
growth opportunity firms. As a result low-Tobin's Q (low- 
growth opportunity ) firms have less negative impact than 
the high-Tobin's Q (high-growth opportunity ) firms. Thus, 
the issue announcement, which itself is a good news, creates 
a marginal dominance of good information in favor of low- 
Tobin's Q firms.
The results are consistent and more interesting when 
the industrial sample is broken into different categories
55 Empirical evidences to date fails to show a significant 
positive association between Tobin's Q and market 
reaction to seasoned equity offerings in a consistent 
way.
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based on exchange listing, type of the issue and the 
multiplicity of the issue. As reported in table 13, out of 
926 industrial sample events 501 sample events belong to the 
low-growth opportunity group and rest of the 425 sample 
events are in the high-growth opportunity group. The 
abnormal return differences between the two groups is 
statistically significant at the less than 5% level. Low- 
growth opportunity firms experiences less value loss than 
high-growth opportunity firms at the announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings. Further break down of the sample 
by the exchange listing, by the type of the issue and by the 
multiplicity of the issue, confirms the overall findings. 
This finding is statistically significant at less than one 
(1) percent level for the NASDAQ listed firms and marginal 
significance (less than 10%) is observed for AMEX listed 
firms.
[ Insert Table 13 about here ]
In the industrial sample, when the sample is grouped by 
the type of the issue, only combined issues show significant 
abnormal return differences. No significant difference is
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observed in event day abnormal return between multiple 
issuers and single issuers (results are not reported in the 
table). But the direction of abnormal return differences is 
consistent with that of the overall sample. When the 
abnormal returns of sample events are cross examined by 
considering the exchange listing in conjunction with type of 
issue and the multiplicity of the issue, the results remain 
consistent except for the multiple issuer samples from the 
NYSE56. Thus, the overall result strongly support the 
negative effects of Tobin's Q, a support for H 3 . This 
suggests that the marginal impact of financing decision on 
high growth/ low growth firm are a determining factor in 
assessing the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings.
To verify the consistency of the results observed 
above, the sample is further grouped by the 75 percentile 
and 25 percentile of industry adjusted median Tobin's Q and 
then t-tests are performed on the differences in mean 
abnormal return of the two groups. It is found that the
56 In this group it is found that the direction of 
difference is opposite. This paper believes that 
previous empirical work's observation of marginal 
insignificant positive association between Tobin's Q and 
event day abnormal return is the result of the influence 
of these sample group in the total sample used in those 
studies.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
results are consistent with results of the overall sample., 
i.e., the high growth firms performing poorly compared to 
low growth firms (results are not reported in the table) , 
and the results are statistically significant.
The above finding contradicts the arguments of the 
existing literature and the findings of previous empirical 
works. It has been argued in the literature that high 
Tobin's Q firms should experience less negative impacts at 
the announcement of seasoned equity issue announcements.
But the findings of previous empirical works in this area 
are inconclusive. The statistically significant difference 
between the growth level observed in this paper is due to 
the stricter grouping criteria for distinguishing between 
high-growth firms and low-growth firms. Such an action is 
warranted due to the finding that on average all seasoned 
equity issuing firms carry a high level of Tobin's Q. The 
negative association between the growth opportunity levels 
(Tobin's Q and abnormal return affirms the fact that market 
reacts to the marginal growth impact of issue announcement. 
That is, the lower the level of Tobin's Q of firms more is 
the marginal positive information
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c) Abnormal Returns and the Combined^.Ef f ect of Leverage 
and Growth ..Qpport uni ties •
This section is intended to test the validity of 
hypothesis four (H4) and hypothesis five (H5) developed in 
Issues and Hypotheses section of this paper. It is observed 
in this study that both the information asymmetry (negative) 
impact (HI) and growth (positive) impact (H2) of the 
leverage effect is present in the market reaction to 
seasoned offering depending on the issue characteristics. 
Additionally, it is also observed in this paper that the 
growth opportunity measure have a significant negative 
association with market reaction to issue announcements 
(H3). This is because the market reacts not directly to the 
growth opportunities but rather to the marginal growth 
impact of such issue announcements. As most issues have 
high Tobin's Q ratio the marginal impact is greater for the 
firms with relatively low Tobin's Q ratio.
Table 14 and table 15 contain the examination of event- 
day abnormal return and 3-day cumulative abnormal return of 
seasoned equity offerings by the growth opportunity level of
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the samples and by the existing leverage level of the sample 
to understand the combined effects of the two variables on 
the market reaction to such announcements. For the total 
sample, event day abnormal returns are more negative for 
high-growth opportunity firms than low-growth opportunity 
firms across the board, but abnormal return differences are 
significant only for the firms within high-leverage group of 
samples. Thus the findings are consistent with the previous 
results.
[ Insert Table 14 about here ]
[ Insert Table 15 about here ]
When the samples are regrouped by industry, by the 
exchange listing of the issue, by the type of the issue - 
primary and combined, and by the multiplicity of the issue - 
single and multiple, significant differences in the event 
day abnormal return (table 14) are present between the high- 
growth opportunity and low-growth opportunity firm for 
industrial samples, for samples listed in the NASDAQ, for 
combined issues and for single issues, when the existing
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leverage level of the firms are high (high-levered firm). 
Table 14 also indicates that for the high-growth opportunity 
samples of industrial firms, the event day abnormal return 
difference between the high-levered firm and low-levered 
firm is marginally significant. Similar marginal 
significant differences between high-levered firms and low- 
levered firms is also found in the low growth opportunity 
samples of Utilities. Among all 20 subgroups, only the low- 
levered sample listed in the NYSE produces an insignificant 
differences between the high-growth opportunity and low- 
growth opportunity firms in favor of high-growth opportunity 
firms. Table 15 also indicates that out of ten (10) 
categories of sample events 6 (six) of the least value loss 
event occurs in low-levered group sample, and the same 
number for the low-growth opportunity firms is 7 (seven).
On the other hand, 7 (seven) out of ten (10) maximum value 
decreasing events took place among the high-levered group, 
and among 8 (eight) amongst the high-growth opportunity 
group. Thus, the findings of this paper supports the 
theoretical prediction of the hypotheses (H4 and H5)
Table 16 reports the results of the cross examination 
of industrial samples. For the total sample there is
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significant support for the information asymmetry impact of 
leverage - a support for hypothesis one (HI) among the high 
growth opportunity firms. For the low-growth opportunity 
firms there is an insignificant support in favor of growth 
impact of leverage - a support for hypothesis two (H2) .
When the sample is broken down by different categories, the 
findings remain consistent, although not statistically 
significant. The only exceptions are found among low-growth 
opportunity AMEX firms and among multiple issuer firms. In 
these cases, the growth impact of leverage remains dominant.
[ Insert Table 16 about here ]
It is also observed in table 16 that event day abnormal 
return difference between the high-growth opportunity firms 
and low-growth opportunity firms is in favor of low-growth 
opportunity firms, that is, the low-growth opportunity firms 
are losing less value at the announcement of seasoned equity 
offerings. The only exceptions to this finding is observed 
in the low-levered categories among the sample from NYSE and 
primary issuers. In both cases the results, are not 
statistically significant. Most of the significant results
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between the performance of high-growth opportunity firms and 
low-growth opportunity firms are observed in the categories 
of NASDAQ listed finns, in combined issues, and in the 
single issuers. For the AMEX listed firms, the significant 
difference between the impacts of issue announcements of 
high-growth opportunity firms and low-growth opportunity 
firms are observed among the low-levered group. Out of 
seven (7) most value decreasing incidences, all seven (7) 
took place amongst the high-growth opportunity group and 
amongst the high-levered group. At the same time, six (6) 
out of the seven (7) least value decreasing events took 
place in the low-growth opportunity group.
By re-examining table 16, where the industrial sample 
of event-day abnormal returns are broken down by the 
leverage level and the level of growth opportunity, samples 
from the NASDAQ market system, from combined issues and from 
single issues sub-group have the least value loss in the 
low-growth opportunity high-levered group, and more 
importantly, the return difference among the growth 
opportunity levels is statistically significant in favor of 
the low-growth opportunity firms in the high-levered group. 
By recalling the growth impact of leverage (H2), and the
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8 6
findings of this paper in section (a) that NASDAQ listed 
firms, and combined issues and issues by the single issuers 
supports the hypothesis of growth impact of leverage (H2), 
it can be concluded that the hypothesis H5 is strongly 
supported in this paper. On the other hand, strong support 
for hypothesis H4 is also observed in the industrial sample. 
All of the maximum value loss events occur in the high- 
levered high-growth opportunity samples. These results are 
consistent with the overall sample results reported earlier. 
In order to investigate, further cross sectional regressions 
on event day abnormal returns are performed in the following 
section.
d) Cross Sectional Regression Analysis:
The event-day abnormal return is the dependent variable 
in the regression analysis. The independent variables are 
the leverage ratio (LEVRG), Tobin's Q (T-Q) ratio, size of 
the issue adjusted by the market value of assets (ISUSIZE), 
Cashflow to total assets (CFTA), and the log of the market 
value of assets (L(MVA)). The dummy TYPE takes a value of 1
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(one) if the issue is a combined issue, else (primary 
issues) takes a value of 0 (zero). The dummy variable MLTPL 
takes a value of 1 (one) if the issue is a multiple issue, 
otherwise it takes the value 0 (zero). If the issue is 
listed in the NASDAQ market system, then dummy XNG1 takes a 
value of 1 (one), otherwise it takes a value of 0 (zero), 
and if the issue is listed in NYSE then the dummy variable 
XNG2 takes value 1 (one), otherwise 0 (zero) .
Table 17 contains the results of the cross sectional 
regression analysis. The results for the overall sample is 
produced in panel A, and in panel B only the industrial 
samples are used. The regression result for the overall 
sample shows that Tobin's Q as an independent variable has a 
consistently negative coefficient, whereas, leverage does 
not have any significant coefficients. But the sign for 
both variables is consistently negative, except for the 
model where leverage is used independently. This affirms 
previous evidence that both leverage and Tobin's Q have a 
negative association with issue announcements. When the 
relative issue size variable (ISUSIZE) is introduced into 
the model, the model's explanatory power - adjusted R- 
squared(ADJ R-SQ) increases substantially (model-4), and the
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issue size variable has a highly statistically significant 
coefficient. This is another indication that issue 
characteristics have significant effect on the market's 
reaction to seasoned equity offerings. Other variables 
introduction in the model do not improve the explanatory 
power nor any of the estimated coefficients are significant. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the dummy 
variables for the type of the issue and for the multiplicity 
of issue are in the direction expected in this paper. That 
is, combined issues add to the negative magnitude of the 
market reaction, whereas, multiplicity adds to the positive 
magnitude of the reaction.
In panel B, where industrial samples are considered, 
the results are quite different. Both leverage ratio and 
Tobin's Q ratio have negative significant coefficients 
throughout the models. The other significant independent 
variable is the relative issue size, but the level of 
significance for this variable drops successively as other 
variables and dummies are introduced into the model, 
specially with the introduction of the dummies for type of 
the issue and the multiplicity of the issue. These findings 
confirm the arguments developed earlier that issue
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characteristics plays an important role in determining the 
magnitude of market reaction to seasoned equity offerings. 
The insignificant coefficients for cashflow to total assets 
(CFTA) and log of market value of assets (L(MVA)) implies 
that market already knows that these firms are high value 
firms and the agency problem of free cashflow is not 
present. This argument is consistent with the previous 
findings that samples' Tobin's Qs are very high.
[ Insert Table 17 about here ]
d) Summary
The examination of the market reaction to seasoned 
equity offering from the perspective of growth and leverage 
is analyzed in the previous section. In the theoretical 
section of this paper, several hypothesizes were developed 
to explain the possible impacts of growth opportunities and 
impacts of the leverage level of issuing firms. Empirical 
research on this area argues that if the issuing firm 
possesses growth opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q,
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then the issuing firm should experience a positive, or at 
least less negative, market reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings. For the traditional growth opportunity theory, 
there is practically no support in this study, except for a 
marginal support in the samples from NYSE57. Previous 
empirical research has documented that there are some 
marginal support from offerings for very high growth firms. 
The evidence in this paper shows that high-growth firms 
consistently perform poorly at the announcement of seasoned 
equity offerings and thus support the alternative view of 
Tobin's Q as presented in this paper. This paper, thus, 
argues that seasoned equity issuing firms are in general 
high-growth opportunity firms (as measured by Tobin's Q 
ratio), therefore, the marginal impact of issue announcement 
is more positive for the low-growth opportunity firms than 
the high-growth opportunity firms.
The impacts of leverage on such issue announcement has 
never been addressed directly. The theoretical argument is 
that a firms high leverage level can prevent the firm from 
capitalizing all investment projects. The problem gets more
57 The only better performance by high Tobin's Q firm is 
observed in the sample from NYSE and only when 3-days 
cumulative abnormal return is used.
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serious with the increase of leverage. Additionally, high 
levered firms suffer from high bankruptcy cost. Both of 
these together should result in an under-valuation of firms 
value, and an undervalued firm should not issue equity 
because that would cause more value loss to the firm. Thus 
a high-levered firm's equity issuance should produce a 
negative market reaction.
This paper examines the impact of leverage from a 
totally different perspective and argues for both 
information asymmetry and growth impact of leverage and 
looks into which of the two argument plays the dominant role 
in determining the market reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings. Although the results are not statistically 
significant when the impact of leverage is examined 
independently, it is observed that the support for a 
particular hypothesis (HI or H2) depends on the issue 
characteristics of the sample events. The sample from 
industries listed in NYSE and in AMEX issuing only primary 
issues by the multiple issuers favors hypothesis one (HI), 
i.e., the information asymmetry impact of leverage is 
dominant, whereas, other sample groups support the growth 
impact of leverage (H2). But when the results are examined
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in conjunction with the growth opportunity measure (Tobin's 
Q) the consistency of the result affirms that leverage has 
both negative and positive effect on the announcement effect 
of seasoned equity offerings, and the dominance of one over 
another depends on other factors, such as, issue and issuer 
related characteristics.
As the effects growth opportunities and leverage level 
is examined simultaneously under hypothesis H4 and 
hypothesis H5 developed in the paper, it is found that high- 
growth high-levered firms are the worst performer and the 
firms with high-leverage and low-growth opportunity firms 
have the least value loss at the announcement of seasoned 
equity offerings. Thus, the results are consistent with the 
predictions of hypothesis H4 and hypothesis H 5 . The 
consistency of the result remains present in both the 
overall sample as well as industrial sample. The finding of 
the validity of both hypotheses (H4 and H5) also supports 
the view expressed in this paper that issue characteristics 
is also an important element in the market's reaction to 
seasoned equity issues market reaction. Cross sectional 
regression results also confirm the above findings.
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B: Diversification & Seasoned Equity Offerings
a) Analysis of Abnormal Returns:
Table 18 presented below shows the event-day abnormal 
return, 3-day cumulative abnormal return, and 5-day 
cumulative abnormal return of the sample selected for this 
section of study. There are 550 sample events where the 
segment information was available from the data source, 
i.e., Compustat PCPLUS. The sample was broken down by the 
industry classification, and then by the relative 
diversification position (i.e., high-focused and low- 
focused) of the issuing firm at the announcement of such 
issue. Sample events were also categorized by the where the 
issuing firm has increased focus (i.e., decreased the level 
of diversification) within the past two years (hereinafter, 
increased focused sample events) and where firms have 
decreased focus successively in the past two years58 
(hereinafter, decreased focused sample events).
58 This grouping is more restrictive for the focus decreased 
group than the focus increased group due the limited 
number of sample events available and also to avoid data 
overlapping between the group.
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[ Insert Table 18 about here ]
There are 67 sample events from the Banks, 3 90 events 
from the Industrial group and 93 samples from the Utilities. 
Of the total sample, 470 sample events belong to the low- 
focused group, and 80 events are in the high-focused group. 
High focused events are defined as those where the issuer 
level of diversification as measured by Herfindahl Index 
(HI) is greater than the median Herfindahl Index of the 
overall sample adjusted by the industry classification of 
the sample59.
For dividing the sample between increased-focus and 
decreased-focus groups, if a firm is not in the focus- 
increased or in the focus-decreased group, then the event is 
dropped in that part of the study. There were 34 samples
59 For further verification of the grouping other methods of 
diversification/focus measures are also used by using the 
number of two-digits SIC code segments and number of 
four-digit SIC code segments for the issuers. When two- 
digit SIC is used 445 events were in the low-focused 
group and 105 events were in the high-focused group, and 
when four-digit SIC is used the numbers are 427 for low- 
focused group and 123 events in the high-focused group, 
but the pattern that most of the issuers are low focused 
firms remains the same.
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that have decreased the focus level successively in the past 
two years over the previous year, and 108 sample have 
increased their focus either in the last year or in the year 
before. The t-statistics reported in the table 18 indicates 
that all the abnormal returns are highly statistically 
significant except for the focus decreased firms.
Table 19 contains the event-day and cumulative abnormal 
returns differences between the low-focused firms and high- 
focused firms by the industry classification. The number of 
low-focused firms out numbered the high focused firms60. It 
is also observed from the table that for the sample from the 
Banks group, the high-focused firm's market reaction to the 
seasoned equity offerings is less negative than that of the 
low-focused firms61. The 3-days cumulative abnormal return 
for the industries are significantly lower for the high- 
focused firm than the low-focused firm. This results 
supports the hypothesis developed earlier that high-focused
60 In order to verify this fact, firms which have only one 
segments over the last three years have been taken off 
from the sample, even in that case it is observed that 
the proportion between the high-focused firms and low- 
focused firms remains the same.
61 The limitation of Bank's sample events is that only 5
(five) out of 67 sample events are in the high-focused 
group, which makes any stronger conclusion unwarranted.
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firms market reaction to seasoned equity offering should be 
less negative (H6) than that of the low-focused firms. The 
reason being that high-focused firm are viewed by the market 
as more valuable, as these firms have lower level of 
information asymmetry due to less diversity in their 
corporate structure.
[ Insert Table 19 about here ]
The maximum value losses are observed for the low- 
focused industrial firms and least value losses for the 
high-focused industrial firms. Thus it is apparent that the 
level of firm focus or diversification matters more for 
Industrial firms than Banks or Utilities. The impacts are 
more favorable in favor of high-focused firms than low- 
focused/diversified firms.
The sample was then grouped by the category of focus- 
increasing and focus-decreasing firms in table 20. The mean 
of the abnormal returns at the announcements of seasoned 
equity offerings for the focused decreased firms are low 
negative/ positive, and are not significantly different from 
zero. For the focus increased group of the sample, the
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abnormal returns are negative and have statistically 
significant t-statistics. The phenomenon is also observed 
for sample events from industrial as well as for 
Utilities52. The mean abnormal return difference between 
the focus increased and focus decreased group is 
significantly different for industrial samples.
[ Insert Table 20 about here ]
These results implies that if issuing firms have 
increased their focus within the past two years by reducing 
the numbers of segments within the organization, and then 
issue equity, the market views that action more negatively. 
When the issuing firms have reduced their number of segment 
by selling some of the existing segments, firms should have 
excess cash in hand or debt capacity outstanding, therefore, 
if money is really needed, why is the cheapest means of 
financing-debt is not used? The market recognizes this, and 
thus reacts more negatively to such announcements by 
increased-focused firms. Thus, this paper finds support for
52 For the sample of Banks due to lake of any event in the 
focus decreased group no conclusion could be drawn.
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the last hypothesis (H7) that focus increasing firms should 
face more of a negative reaction at the announcement of 
seasoned equity offerings.
b) Cross Sectional Regression Analysis
Results of the cross sectional regression is produced 
in table 21. Panel-1 uses the overall sample of 550 sample 
events. Results indicate that the coefficient of Herfindahl 
index variable is consistently statistically insignificant, 
but have positive sign. The coefficient for the dummy 
variables for focus level (HF/LF-D) is found to be 
statistically significant and has positive sign. This 
implies that market's reaction to seasoned equity offerings 
has a positive association with issuing firms level of 
diversification/ focus. That is, if the firm is more 
focused, the less is the negative reaction, hence hypothesis 
H6 is supported. The coefficients for the variable cash­
flow to total assets and market value of assets are 
statistically significant and positive. The signs and 
significance levels of other variable used in the regression
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models is similar Co what have been observed throughout this 
paper.
[ Insert Table 21 about here ]
The results of the total industrial samples are shown 
in the panel 2 of table 21. The results for the total 
industrial sample are consistent with the findings of the 
overall sample, except for the coefficient for cashflow to 
total assets (CFTA), which is not significant any more but 
have the same positive sign. The coefficient for the focus 
level (HF/LF-D) dummy remains consistently positive and 
significant throughout the models. This findings strongly 
supports the validity of hypothesis H6. When the industrial 
sample is categorized by the focus level, it is found that 
the regression models in the high-focus level (panel 4) have 
no explanatory power, and none of the independent variables 
are statistically significant. This could be attributed to 
the fact that the sample size for this group is very small. 
For the low-focused group (panel 3) results are consistent 
with the results of the total sample.
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In order to investigate further the market's 
differential reaction to seasoned equity offering by the 
issuing firms focus activities in the past, samples are 
grouped into the categories of focus-increased and focus- 
decreased groups. Samples those do not fall in any of this 
categories are dropped. The cross sectional regressions of 
the sample groups are produced in table 22. For the total 
sample (panel A) it is observed that the coefficient for the 
dummy (INC/DCR-F) to separate the sample between the focus- 
increased group and the focus-decreased group is 
consistently negative and statistically significant. When 
only the Industrial group is used in panel B, the results 
are the same, except that the level of significance drops as 
3-day cumulative abnormal returns are used. This finding 
supports the arguments developed in hypothesis H7 that 
focus-increased firms' equity issuance is negatively viewed 
by the market due to potential free cash flow problems 
and/or management's inefficiency in the use of funds to 
finance investment projects. This argument is supported 
when it is observed that the coefficient for cashflow to 
total assets consistently shows a negative sign. A stronger 
conclusion in this aspect could not be drawn due to
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statistical insignificance of the estimated parameter for 
the cash flow to total assets variable.
[ Insert Table 23 about here ]
c) Summary
The market's reaction to seasoned equity offerings and 
corporate diversification reveals that the market's reaction 
to seasoned equity offerings has a significant positive 
association with the issuing firms focus /diversification 
level. That is, if the issuing firm belongs to the high- 
focused group, then the issue announcement has a less 
negative impact. The statistically significant difference 
in abnormal returns exists between the two group in favor of 
high-focused firms. Thus, the empirical findings here 
clearly support hypothesis H 5 . The results of the regression 
analysis further affirm the findings by showing a 
significant coefficient for the focus level dummy.
When the results are examined by the focus activity of 
the issuing firm, it is found that the focus decreased firms
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market reactions to seasoned equity offerings is 
insignificantly negative. Whereas, the firms which have 
increased their focus in the past have negative significant 
market reactions. It is also observed that the mean 
difference in abnormal returns between the focus increased 
group and focus decreased group is statistically 
significant. This result supports the arguments of 
hypothesis H7 developed in the Issues and Hypothesis section 
of this paper. The cross-sectional regression result also 
show evidence supporting the empirical findings.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Until recently the empirical investigation of seasoned 
equity announcements implicitly assumed that all issuing 
firms were unlevered firms. This study addresses the issue 
of market reaction to seasoned equity offering from the 
perspective of a levered firm. This study documents that 
issuing firms existing leverage level has a significant 
impact on the event-day abnormal return of the issuing firm. 
It is also documented in this study that impacts of leverage 
on the market reaction to seasoned equity offerings could be 
positive (growth impact of leverage) or negative 
(information asymmetry impact of leverage) depending on the 
issue characteristics, such as, the exchange listing of the 
issue, the type of the issue, and multiplicity of the issue. 
It is found that issues from industrial firms listed in 
NASDAQ market system, combined issues, single issues support 
the growth impact of leverage hypothesis (H2). Where as the 
information asymmetry impact of leverage hypothesis (HI) is 
supported in the samples from AMEX and NYSE listed issues,
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in primary issues and in the issues by the multiple issuers. 
These finding remain consistent when other factors like the 
growth opportunities of issuing firms is introduced in the 
analysis.
Another important distinctive feature of this paper is 
the relationship between Tobin's Q as a growth measure and 
event-day and 3 -day cumulative abnormal returns is 
consistently and significantly negative. This result 
supports the marginal growth argument (H3) developed in this 
paper. The average Tobin's Q ratio for the issuing firms is 
very high, indicating that the firms who make the decision 
to issue equity are firms' with ample growth opportunities. 
Therefore, the marginal "good news" impact from the seasoned 
equity issue announcement is greater for the low growth 
firms than that for the high-growth firm. Combining the 
arguments of the leverage effect and the marginal growth 
opportunity effect and the relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunity the finding of this paper confirms the 
theoretical argument that growth plays an important role in 
determining the market reaction to seasoned equity offering, 
but not in the way the previous works have argued for.
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It is important here to mention the distinctive feature 
of this study compared to other studies: first, this study 
includes samples from the NASDAQ market; second, this study 
excluded sample events which have similar seasoned issue 
events within a one year period around event date and other 
similar events within one month of the event date to 
eliminate any confounding effects. The results indicate 
that the NASDAQ listed firms loses more value than the firms 
listed in NYSE. This finding is opposite to what is 
popularly thought that NASDAQ firms should perform better, 
as these firms are more rapidly growing firms and mostly 
technology firms. But the results is consistent with the 
argument of McLaughlin et al (1998), that smaller firms 
(NASDAQ) suffer more from information asymmetry problem than 
the larger firms as more analysts follow larger firms.
The analysis of the impacts of corporate focus/ 
diversification on market's reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings reveals that the market reaction is less negative 
for the high-focused firm when compared with low-focused 
diversified firms. The argument is high-focused firms are 
high value firms as well as having less information 
asymmetry due to their lower level of diversity. Therefore,
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issue announcements by this category of firm has less of a 
negative impact when compared with diversified (low-focused) 
firms.
While examining the differential market reaction to 
equity announcements by focus-increased firms and focus 
decreased firms, it is found that the market reacts 
negatively to announcements by firms who have increased 
their focus level in the recent past. The argument for 
these focus-increased firms is that the financing need 
should be met by the funds already acquired through the 
focus increasing activity in the recent past. Therefore, 
these firms' additional fund requirements increases the free 
cash flow problem, and thus should have negative reaction to 
such announcements. The findings are consistent with the 
argument, when it is observed that cashflow to total asset 
has a negative coefficient in the regression result. More 
importantly, in the regression the dummy for focus activity 
(INC/DCR-F) is consistently negative and significant.
It is also important here to note that low levered 
firms issuing equity may signal under-utilization of 
resources, i.e., inefficiency of management, but under 
certain circumstance such a conclusion is not always true,
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specially, in case of high technology based firms. A great 
number of growth opportunities for such firms lies in the 
possession of technological advancements and/ or know-how. 
These high technology based firms face a dilemma. They 
cannot issue debt to finance new projects, because that 
would increase their overall distress situation. On the 
other hand, they are high growth firms and they cannot 
afford to pass the opportunity to invest in new projects. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to examine how market 
reacts to these high technology based firms issue 
announcements.
This paper consistently observes that the significance 
level of event-day abnormal returns are much higher than 
that of the 3-day cumulative abnormal return, specially when 
returns are compared among the groups. Therefore, a further 
study to investigate the market efficiency of seasoned 
equity offerings would be of great value. Results not 
reported in this study also reveal that the mean difference 
between 5-day cumulative abnormal return 10 days prior to 
the event date and 5-day cumulative abnormal return 10 days 
after the event day are not statistically significant. This 
suggests that the negative reaction to season equity
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offerings may just be the effect of price pressure at the 
announcement date, but such a conclusion needs further 
investigation.
Finally, the findings of this paper indicate that the 
understanding of the market's reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings is far from conclusive. The results bring into 
serious question the conclusions of the previous empirical 
work.
%
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Figure 1
Figure showing the estimation Period, Event Window, and
their relative position
Estimation Period Event Window
-162 36 -15 + 15
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Table 1
The description of the data collection process from the Primary source - 
half yearly publication from the Investment Dealers Digest, (a, b, c, d, 
e, and refers to the selection criteria discussed in the data section of 
methodology)
Primary1 Seasoned and Combined2 Seasoned Equity 
offerings from the Primary source
LBSS(a ft b):
Sample firms NOT available in Compustat & 
CRSP data tape for 1996.
LBSS (c ft d) :
Sample Events(Other seasoned equity issues) 
within the past 12 months or subsequent 12 
month period. Other issue(e.g., debt etc., 
within the days around event date.
LBSS(b) :
Sample Event does not have daily return data 
data for -162 through +15 days of event date 
AND, Sample Firms change in Accounting 
Reporting date between 1983 and 1994.





Sample Firms NOT listed in New York Stock Exchange, 
American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ Market System.
TOTAL Sample Bventa used in the Study
TOTAL Sample Firms used in the Study
Sample events dropped as segment data not available 







Total Sample Bvent available for segment analysis 550 events.
Primary Seasoned offering refers to the pure seasoned equity offering 
where no other issue is involved.
Combined Seasoned offering refers to primary and secondary seasoned 
equity offering at the same date.


















The distribution o f Sample Events' and Sample Firms2 by Exchange listing1 - New York Stock Exchange(NYSE), American Stock Exchange(AMEX), and 
NASDAQ Market system(NSDQ); by Industry classification4 - Industrial (IND), Banks and Financial Institutions(BNK) and Utilities(UTL). and by the Event 
year.
YEAR SAMPLE EVENTS BY 
EXCHANGE
















IND BNK UTL TOTA
L
IND BNK UTL TOTAL
1983 126 16 65 207 126 16 65 207 179 11 17 207 179 II 17 207
1984 30 03 17 so 27 03 15 45 25 09 16 50 22 08 15 45
1985 61 06 43 110 53 05 37 95 67 30 13 110 56 30 09 95
1986 73 08 45 126 58 06 37 101 85 31 10 126 73 22 06 101
1987 56 09 20 85 34 06 16 56 65 10 10 85 45 06 05 56
1988 22 03 II 36 II 02 08 21 25 05 06 36 15 03 03 21
1989 43 14 29 86 30 10 25 65 50 16 20 86 43 08 14 65
1990 35 03 23 61 22 03 14 39 41 08 12 61 29 05 05 39
1991 94 10 61 165 55 04 42 101 107 36 22 165 74 22 05 101
1992 89 15 43 147 52 07 29 88 98 27 22 147 64 13 1) 88
1993 120 15 52 187 61 09 32 102 117 35 35 187 69 20 13 102
1994 58 06 29 93 41 05 18 64 67 18 08 93 46 16 02 64
TOTA
L
807 108 438 1353 570 76 338 984 926 236 191 1353 715 164 105 984
1 Sample Events are the Seasoned Equity issue events between 1983 and 1994.
2 Sample Firms are the Seasoned Equity issuing firms.
1 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.




















The distribution o f Sample Events by Exchange listing1 - New York Stock Exchange(NYSE), American Stock Exchange(AMEX), and NASDAQ Market 
system(NSDQ); and by Industry classification - Industrial(IND), Banks and Financial Institutions(BNK) and Utilities(UTL). Samples are also distributed 
by the Type o f issue - Primary (the seasoned equity issue where secondary issues were not involved on the same date), and Combined (the issues where 
both primary and secondary took place at the same date), and by the multiplicity of issue (If the firm made more than one issue within the sample period 
then the issue is a multiple issue, else are Single issue events).
EXCHANGE PRIMARY COMBINED TOTAL
SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL
NYSE 320 328 648 103 56 159 423 384 807
AMEX • 40 32 72 24 12 36 64 44 108
NSDQ 137 113 250 129 59 188 266 172 438
TOTAL 497 473 970 256 127 383 753 600 1353
INDUSTRIES
INDUSTRIAL 340 249 589 232 105 337 572 354 926
FINANCIAL 112 90 202 17 17 34 129 107 236
UTILITIES 45 134 179 07 05 12 52 139 191
TOTAL 497 473 970 256 127 383 753 600 1353
1 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.
2 Industry classification is done using the first two-digit if Standard Industry Classification(SIC)code, available in the Compustat data Tape.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the Overall sample. Relative Primary and Combined 
issues refers to issue size relative to Market value o f Assets. Adjusted(Adj.) 
variable are the difference in the value of variable from it’s receptive 
Industry (two-digit SIC) and Exchange median - value. For details of the 
calculation process of the variables please refer to Appendix B.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum
Issue Price 1353 24.0276 14.1349 2 1 2 5 1.375 146
Relative Primary Issue 970 0.261 0.3533 0.13 0.00136 3.3174
Relative Combined Issue 383 0.762 0.9942 0.4877 0.0137 10.5573
Leverage 1344 0.2667 0 2 1 8 7 0 2 3 1 9 0 1
Adj. Leverage 1343 0.0272 0.1811 0 -0.5203 0.9553
Tobins Q 1353 1-2311 1.3168 0.8643 -0.1737 12.4019
Market-to-Book 1353 1.9208 2.0311 1.3472 1.0053 27.8118
1-Yr growth on ROS 1272 -0.1625 13.9209 0.0217 -340.9 296.9
3-Yr growth on ROS 1276 -0.1646 13.8993 0.0217 -340.9 296.9
Adj. Tobin's Q 1353 0.4823 1.2052 0.0629 -1.6617 11.748
Adj. Market-to-Book 1353 0.1186 1.2477 -0.0021 -5.871 22.6087
adj. 1-Yr growth on ROS 1272 •0.1446 13.9205 0.0285 -341.1 296.8
adj. 3-Yr growth on ROS 1272 -0.1446 13.9205 0.0285 -341.1 296.8
Return on Sales(ROS) 1313 -0.078 3.729 0.1361 -117.6 0.883
Return on Assets 1315 0.1218 0.121 0.1222 -0.661 0.9479
Cash-Flow to Total Assets 1315 0.0551 0.0955 0.0541 -0.6624 0.564
Market Value o f  Assets 1353 1233.6 4804.3 166.3 2.708 122639


















Distribution o f segment sample events by the Type o f issue - Primary1 and Combined2 and by the multiplicity of issue1 by the same firm. The distribution is 
presented by the Exchange listing4 in panel A and by the Industry classification’ in panel B.
EXCHANGE PRIMARY COMBINED TOTAL
SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL SINGLE MULTIPLE TOTAL
NYSE 121 147 268 49 27 76 170 174 344
AMEX 12 II 23 12 07 19 24 18 42
NSDQ 48 43 91 42 31 73 90 74 164
TOTAL 171 201 382 103 65 168 305 245 550
'
INDUSTRIES
INDUSTRIAL 135 109 244 92 54 146 227 163 390
BANKS 24 24 48 08 II 19 32 35 67
UTILITIES 22 68 90 03 0 3 25 68 93
TOTAL 192 190 382 113 55 168 305 245 550
1 Primary Issue refers to the seasoned equity issue where secondary issues were not involved on the same date.
2 Combined Issues are those where primary and secondary seasoned equity issue took place at the same date.
3 Multiplicity o f issue refers to issue events by each sample firm. If the firm made more than one issue within (he sample period then the issue is a multiple 
issue, else Single issue.
4 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.




Descriptive statistics for the Segment sample. Relative Primary and Combined 
issues refers to issue size relative to Market value o f Assets. Adjustment Adj.) refers to 
the adjustment of the variable relative to the industry and exchange. Adjusted variable 
are the difference of variable from it's respective Industry(two-digit SIC) and Exchange 
median value. For details of the calculation process of the variables please refer to 
Appendix B.
Variable N Mean Std Dev Median MIN MAX
Issue Price 550 24.0871 14.5164 21.5000 1.6250 146.0000
Relative Primary Issue 382 0.2726 0.3714 0.1326 0.0057 2.3354
Relative Combined Issue 168 0.7486 1.0872 0.5102 0.0401 10.5573
Leverage 550 0.2732 0.2251 0.2395 0.0000 1.0000
Adj. Leverage 549 0.0247 0.1785 0.0000 -0.5203 0.6449
Tobins Q 550 1.3117 1.1663 0.9531 -0.0340 12.3180
Market-to-Book 550 1.5029 0.8817 1.3269 1.0053 12.4875
1-Yr growth on ROS 522 0.7604 13.4888 0.0274 -15.5958 296.9000
3-Yr growth on ROS 523 0.7591 13.4759 0.0275 -15.5958 296.9000
Adj. Tobin’s Q 550 0.4410 1.0907 0.0884 -1.6617 11.7480
Adj. Market-to-Book 550 0.1019 0.7386 0.0000 -2.1441 9.1501
adj. 1 -Yr growth on ROS 522 0.7800 13.4830 0.0348 -15.5540 296.8000
adj. 3-Yr growth on ROS 522 0.7800 13.4830 0.0348 -15.5540 296.8000
Return on Sales(ROS) 528 -0.2657 5.4627 0.1360 -117.6000 0.8830
Return on Assets 529 0.1176 0.1364 0.1205 -0.6610 0.9479
Cash-Flow to Total Assets 529 0.0520 0.1158 0.0604 -0.6624 0.4127
Market Value o f  Assets 550 1421.9000 6091.6000 221.9000 3.7920 122639.0000


















Distribution of segment sample events by the Industry classification1 and Exchange listing2 of the sample events. Panel - 
A shows the distribution for the sample events by the Focus level - high-focus and low-focus; Panel B shows the 
distribution by the focus activity over the last three years - Increased focus and decreased focus.
INDUSTRIES EXCHANGES TOTAL
BANK INDUSTRY UTILITIES AMEX NASDAQ NYSE INDUSTRY EXCHANGE
PANEL - A
HIGH-FOCUSED 05 35 40 03 02 75 80 80
LOW-FOCUSED 62 355 53 39 162 269 470 470
TOTAL 67 390 93 42 164 344 550 550
PANEL - B
FOCUS-INCREASED 10 70 28 07 II 90 108 108
FOCUS-DECREASED 0 22 12 02 02 30 34 34
TOTAL 10 92 40 09 13 120 142 142
1 Exchange listing is identified through the exchange listing code available in the Compustat Annual data tape.
2 Industry classification is done using the first two-digit if Standard Industry Classiflcation(SIC) code, available in the Compustat data Tape.
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Table-8
Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and S-days cumulative abnormal return 
around the event date. Event date is the seasoned equity offering date. Sample are broken down by 
Industry, Exchange listing. Type of the issue, and the multiplicity of the issuer. Numbers in the Italic are 
the t-statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where on the same event date both primary 
and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers of which issued 
more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification of 
the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to separate the sample 
events between the Industries.
% OF POSITIVE 
ON EVENT-DAY
CARoq CAR.,., C A R .,,
Total Sample (1333) 34.883% •0.008416 -0.021626 -0.024328
(-11.8163) (-1.93871) (-1.7085)
Banks (236) 41.949% -0.0061584 -0.0174887 -0.020792
(-4.2232) (-7.0945) (-6.1614)
Industrial (926) 33.153% -0.0097866 -0.0249151 -0.027326
(-9.6227) (-14.4787) (-12.335)
Utilities (191) 34.555% -0.0045605 -0.017934 -0.014165
(-3.8706) (-5.3319) (-5.2658)
American Stock Exchange (108) 29.630% -0.0118388 -0.0258581 -0.030098
(-4.2486) (-5.4790) (-5.0175)
NASDAQ Market System (438) 34.932% -0.0096865 -0.026187 -0.029278
(-5.6966) (-10.0125) (-8.5659)
New York Stock Exchange (807) 35.564% -0.0072684 -0.0185847 -0.020870
(-9.1119) (-12.3480) (-10.747)
Multiple Issues (600) 36.167% -0.0077751 -0.0195346 -0.022475
(-7.6902) (-10.9226) (-9.8468)
Single Issues (733) 33.864% -0.0089268 -0.0232929 -0.025805
(-8.0736) (-12.7017) (-10.767)
Combined Issues (383) 33.420% -0.0114059 -0.0272091 -0.028946
(-6.8148) (-9.5281) (-7.8069)
Primary Issues (970) 35.464% -0.0072355 -0.0194219 -0.225050
(-8.7313) (-13.8481) (-12.380)
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Table • 9
Event-day abnormal returns, and 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal 
return for the overall sample around the event date o f  the high-levered firms and low levered firms grouped 
by the industry classification, by the exchange listing o f  the issue, types o f  the issue and by the multiplicity 
o f the issue. High-levered firms are those whose event year minus one leverage is greater than the industry 
and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same event rfar«» both 
primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f  which 
issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange 
identification o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample events between the Industries.
CARo.o C A R -i.! CAR-2.2
Total Sample Low-Levered (687) -0.00901994 -0.02184419 -0.02375360
High-Levered (666) -0.00779306 -0.02140140 -0.02492123
Differences -0 00122688 -0.000442~9 0.00116~63
Banks Low-Levered (110) •0.00860890 -0.01784080 -0.02067191
High-Levered (126) -0.00401903 -0.01718135 -0.02089591
Differences -0.00458987 -0.00065945 0.00022400
Industrial Low-Levered (502) -0.00993390 -0.02428773 -0.02549117
High-Levered (424) •0.00961230 -0.02565793 -0.02949860
Differences -0.0003216 0.0013702 0 00400743
Utilities Low-Levered (75) -0.00350533 -0.01136035 -0.01664321
High-Levered (116) -0.00524280 -0.01042687 -0.01256249
Differences 0.00173747 -0.00093348 -0 00408072
AMEX Low-Levered (74) -0.01014424 -0.02377340 -0.02790236
High-Levered (34) -0.01552703 -0.03039536 -0.03487643
Differences 0.00538279 0.00662196 0.0069'407
NASDAQ Low-Levered (233) •0.01082192 -0.02779233 -0.02778555
High-Levered (205) -0.00839600 -0.02436161 -0.03097354
Differences -0.00242592 -0.00343072 0.00318~99
NYSE Low-Levered (380) -0.00769609 -0.01782135 -0.02047345
High-Levered (427) -0.00688777 -0.01926407 -0.02122287
Differences -0.00080832 0.00144272 0.00074942
Combined Low-Levered (230) •0.01250668 -0.02886600 -0.03035049
High-Levered (153) -0.00975108 -0.02471821 -0.02683521
Differences -0.00275560 -0.00414779 -0.00351528
Primary Low-Levered (457) -0.00726512 -0.01831023 -0.02043350
High-Levered (513) -0.00720910 -0.02041217 -0.02435039
Differences -0.00005602 0.00210194 0.00391689
Multiple Low-Levered (289) -0.00679392 -0.01934845 -0.02267766
High-Levered (311) •0.00868678 -0.01970750 -0.02228623
Differences 0.00189286 0.00035905 -0.00039143
Single Low-Levered (398) -0.01063632 -0.02365642 -0.02453487
High-Levered (355) -0.00701012 -0.02288535 -0.02722964
Differences -0.00362620 -0.00077/07 0.00269477
•  (**) ( • •* )  denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level


















Event-day abnormal returns and 3-days cumulative abnormal returns for the seasoned equity issue events by the Industrial firms. Sample are split by the low- 
levered firms and high levered firms with further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f  issue and multiplicity o f the issue. High-levered firms are those 
whose event year leverage is greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same event date both 
primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f  which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the 
sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification o f the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to separate the 
sample events between the Industries







TOTAL SAMPLE 502/424 -0.00993390 -0.02428773 -0.00961230 -0.02565793 -0.0003216 4 0.0013702
*
AMEX 61/28 -0.01294373 -0.02601513 -0.01597460 -0.03760886 +0.003031 i 0.0115937
NASDAQ 199/155 -0.01016563 -0.02817043 -0.00889383 -0.02657569 •0.001270 -0.0015947
NYSE 242/241 -0.00898467 -0.02065951 -0.00933520 -0.02367918 +0.000351 +0.0030197
MULTIPLE ISSUER 187/168 -0.00834376 -0.02495967 •0.01102412 -0.02316805 +0.002680 -0.0017916
SINGLE ISSUER 315/257 -0.01087789 -0.02388884 -0.00869489 -0.023727587 •0.002180 -0.0001613
COMBINED ISSUES 200/137 -0.01289801 -0.02947587 -0.01179954 -0.02729079 -0.001100 -0.0021851
PRIMARY ISSUES 302/287 -0.00797091 -0.02085188 -0.00856822 -0.02487848 +0.000597 +0.0040266
AMEX - COMBINE ISSUES 21/10 -0.02170565 -0.01823663 -0.00227404 -0.04411968 -0.019432* +0.0258831
NASDAQ-MULTIPLE 72/58 -0.01388433 -0.03577530 -0.00786096 -0.01583633 -0.0199390 -0.0199390**
NYSE - MULTIPLE ISSUE 89/100 -0.00100277 -0.01487582 -0.01360803 -0.02593927 +0.012605*** +0.0110635
NYSE - SINGLE ISSUE 153/141 -0.01362774 -0.02402388 -0.00630482 -0.02207628 -0.007323** -0.0019476
PRIMARY-MULTIPLE ISSUES 120/129 -0.00493202 -0.01795736 -0.01160626 -0.02431573 +.0.006674* +0.0063584




I able - tl
The descriptive statistics o f Tobin 's 0  variable used to differentiate between high- 
growth firms and Iow-growth firms. 0 1 *03 refers to the mean o f  2nd quartile and 3rd 
quartiie o f  the Tobin’s Q ratio. Samples are broken down by the type o f  industry, 
exchange listing, multiplicity o f  the issue and by the type o f  the issue.
MEAN MEDIAN Q1-Q3
Total Sample (1333) 1.229851 0.862519 0.880239
Banks (236) 1.125218 0.181806 0.954754
Industrial (926) 1.419943 0.995048 1.065508
Utilities (191) 0.900343 0.815083 0.160610
American Stock Exchange (108) 1.423621 1.039118 1.120032
NASDAQ Market System (438) 1.626855 1.137566 1.500464
New York Stock Exchange (807) 0.988445 0.796136 0.631616
Multiple Issues (600) 1.254251 1.609755 0.849879
Single Issues (733) 1.210509 1.385209 0.922627
Combined Issues (383) 1.612180 1.139653 1.181697
Primary Issues (970) 1.078890 0.799130 0.751509
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Table - 12
Event-day abnormal returns, and 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal 
return for the overall sample around the event date by the low-Growth firms and high Growth firms with 
further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f  issue and multiplicity o f  the issue. High-growth firms 
are those whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than one(I) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the 
industry and exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. Combined offerings are where on the same event date 
both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f  
which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange 
identification o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample events between the Industries.
--------------
CARo.o CAR-1.1 car. 2.2
Total Sample Low-Growth (845) -0.00652826 -0.01958619 -0.02055383
High-Growth (508) -0.01155609 -0.02501959 -0.03060684
Differences +0.005028*** +0.005433** +0.010053***
Banks Low-Growth ( 179) -0.00590927 -0.01689038 -0.01800872
High-Growth (57) -0.00694066 -0.01936770 -0.02953041
Differences 0.00103139 0.00247732 0.01152169
Industrial Low-Growth (501) -0.00762368 -0.02365321 -0.02412345
High-Growth (425) -0.01233640 -0.02640270 -0.03110148
Differences 0.00471272** 0.00274949 0.00697803
Utilities Low-Growth (165) •0.00387368 -0.01016181 -0.01247623
High-Growth (26) -0.00891952 -0.01480175 -0.02488120
Differences 0.00504584 0.00463994 0.01240497
AMEX Low-Growth (54) •0.00853828 -0.02321064 •0.02131926
High-Growth (54) -0.01513937 -0.02850555 -0.03887655
Differences 0.00660109 0.00529491 0.01755729
NASDAQ Low-Growth (218) -0.00496036 -0.02018607 -0.02048789
High-Growth (220) -0.01436968 -0.03213263 -0.03798750
Differences 0.00940932*** 0.01194656** 0.01749961**
NYSE Low-Growth (573) -0.00693535 •0.01901640 -0.02050678
High-Growth (234) -0.00808394 -0.01752766 -0.02175936
Differences 0.00114859 •0.00148874 0.00125258
Combined Low-Growth (180) -0.00580250 -0.02079369 -0.01786809
High-Growth (203) -0.01637438 -0.03289755 -0.03876917
Differences 0.01057188*** 0.01210386** 0.02090108***
Primary Low-Growth (665) -0.00672471 -0.01925935 •0.02T28080
High-Growth (305) -0.00834917 -0.01977622 -0.02517420
Differences 0.00162446 0.00051687 0.0038934
Multiple Low-Growth (370) •0.00662853 -0.01828522 -0.01886964
High-Growth (230) •0.00961945 -0.02154435 -0.02827431
Differences 0.00299092 0.00325913 0.00940467*
Single Low-Growth (475) -0.00645015 -0.02059958 -0.02186572
High-Growth (278V -0.01315836 -0.02789478 •0.03253663
Differences 0.00670821 0.0072952 0.01067091**
* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level


















Event day abnormal returns and 3-days cumulative abnormal returns for the seasoned equity issue events by the Industrial firms. Sample are split by the low- 
Growth Firms and high Growth firms with further broken down by the exchange listing, type o f issue and multiplicity of the issue. High-growth firms are those 
whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than one(l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median Tobin's Q. High-levered 
firms are those whose event year leverage is greater than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are those where on the same 
event date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers o f which issued more than one seasoned equity 
issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange identification o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample events between the Industries.








TOTAL SAMPLE 501/425 -0.00762368 •0.01958619 -0.01233640 -0.02501939 +0.00471272** +0.005433**
AMEX 44/45 -0.00795398 -0.02447581 -0.01970846 -0.03473412 +0 01175448* +00102583
NASDAQ 141/213 -0.00327758 -0.0220S46I -0.01379984 -0.03105844 +0 01052226*** +0.0090038
NYSE 316/167 -0.00951693 -0.02425197 -0.00848338 -0.01821954 •0.00103355 •00060324
MULTIPLE ISSUER 176/178 •0.00831212 -0.02395633 •0.01069202 -0.02427084 +0.00217990 +0.0003145
SINGLE ISSUER 325/247 -0.00714255 -002348905 •0.01352142 -0.02793902 +0.00637887** +00044500
COMBINED ISSUES I32/I8S -0.00721672 -0.02249224 -0.01675243 -0.03359564 +0.00953571*** +0.0111034*
PRIMARY ISSUES 349/240 -0.00780092 -002415885 •0.00893238 -0.02085814 +0.00113146 -00033007
AMEX - COMBINED ISSUES 21/10 -0.00277684 -0.02338303 -0.02730665 -0.04785038 +0.02452981* +0 0244674
AMEX-MULTIPLE ISSUES +0.00200050 -0.02329038 -0.02156923 -0.03617190 *0.02356973** +0 0128815
NASDAQ-COMBINED 68/106 -0.00557633 -0.02555193 •0.01865056 -0.03489720 +0.01307423** +0.0093453
NASDAQ - MULTIPLE 43/87 •0.00438548 -001712870 -0.01456359 -0.03169879 +0.01017811* +0.0145701
NASDAQ - SINGLE 98/126 -0.00279146 -0.02421398 -0.01327248 •0.03061629 +0.01048102** +00064003
NYSE-PRIMARY 247/104 -0.00943826 -000703262 -0.02563999 -0 01242480 +0.0162017 +00053922**
NYSE - MULTIPLE 122/67 -0.01091445 •0 02642284 -0.00176845 -0.01036252 -0.00914600** -0 0160603
COMBINED - MULTIPLE 41/64 -0.00655963 -002342432 •0.01630184 -0.03569552 ♦ 0.00974221* +00122712
COMBINED - SINGLE 111/121 -0.00745943 -0.02214796 -0.01699075 •0.03248496 +000953132** ♦ 0 0103370
* (**)(***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.03) (0 .01) level 130
Table 14
Event day abnormal returns o f  the Overall sample events broken down by the leverage level and growth 
level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f  sample events. High-growth firms are those whose 
event year Tobin’s Q is greater than one(l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and 
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those whose event year leverage is greater 
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event 
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers 
o f  which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange 
identification o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample between the Industries.
LOW-LEVERED HIGH-LEVERED DIFFERENCES
TOTAL SAMPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00738888 (315) -0.00601676 (530) -0.0013~212
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01040108 (372) -0.01471541 (136) 0 00431433
DIFFERENCES 0.0030122 0 00869865“ *
BANKS LOW-GROWTH -0.00824357 (76) -0.00418687(102) -0.004056~
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00942552 (34) -0.00326740 (23) -0.00615812
DIFFERENCES 0.00118195 -0.00091947
INDUSTRIALS LOW-GROWTH -0.00884247(186) -0.00690401 (315) -0.00193846
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01057633 (316) -0.01743901 (109) 000686268*
DIFFERENCES 0.00173386 0.010535*“
UTILITIES LOW-GROWTH •0.00106201 (53) -0.00520420(112) 0.00414219*
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00939150(22) -0.00632360 (04) -0.0030679
DIFFERENCES 0.00832949 0.0011194
AMEX LOW-GROWTH -0.00449467 (30) -0.01359279 (24) 0.00909812
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01399622(44) -0.02016923(10) 0.00617301
DIFFERENCES 0.00950155“ 0.00657644
NASDAQ LOW-GROWTH -0.00731447(75) -0.00372569(143) -0 003588"8
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01248685(158) -0.01916786 (62) 0.00668101
DIFFERENCES 0.00517238 0.01544217•**
NYSE LOW-GROWTH -0.00782891 (210) -0.00641841 (363) -0 0014105
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00753203 (170) -0.00954995 (64) 0 0020 r  92
DIFFERENCES ■0.00029688 0.00313154
COMBINED LOW-GROWTH -0.00859026 (73) -0.00390057(107) -0.00468969
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01432769 (157) -0.02335980 (46) 0.00903211
DIFFERENCES 0.00573743 0.01945923*“
PRIMARY LOW-GROWTH -0.00702648 (242) -0.00655206 (423) -0.00047442
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00753373 (215) -0.01029717(90) 000276344
DIFFERENCES 0.00050725 0.00374511
MULTIPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00466210(127) -0.00765626 (243) 0.00299416
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00846516 (162) •0.01236936 (68) 0 0039042
DIFFERENCES 0.00380306 0.0047131
SINGLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00923090(188) •0.00462861 (287) -0.00460229
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01189449(210) -0.01706147(68) 0.00516698
DIFFERENCES 0.00266359 0.01243286“
* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table— 15
3-Day cumulative abnormal returns o f  the Overall sample events broken down by the leverage level and 
growth level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f  sample events. High-growth firms are those 
whose event year Tobin’s Q is greater than one(I) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and 
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those whose event year leverage is greater 
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event 
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers 
o f  whic- ssued more than one seasoned equity issue over the sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange 
identifkuiion o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample between the Industries.
LOW-LEVERED HIGH-LEVERED DIFFERENCES
TOTAL SAMPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.01848642 -0.02023983 0.00175341
HIGH-GROWTH -0.02468745 -0.02592807 0.00124062
DIFFERENCES 0.00620103' 0.00568824
BANKS LOW-GROWTH -0.01732883 -0.01654318 -0.00078565
HIGH-GROWTH -0.02814468 -0.02003922 -0.00810546
DIFFERENCES 0.01081585 0.00349604
INDUSTRIALS LOW-GROWTH -0.02170288 -0.02480483 0.00310195
HIGH-GROWTH -0.02580919 -0.02812331 0.00231412
DIFFERENCES 0.00410631 0.00331848
UTILITIES LOW-GROWTH -0.00881237 -0.01080038 0.00198801
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01749868 0.00003137 -0.01753005'
DIFFERENCES 0.00868631 -0.01083175"
AMEX LOW-GROWTH -0.01666242 -0.03139593 0.01473351
HIGH-GROWTH -0.0286218 •0.02799404 •0.00062776
DIFFERENCES 0.01195938 -0.00340189
NASDAQ LOW-GROWTH -0.0192469 -0.02067865 0.00143175
HIGH-GROWTH -0.03184871 -0.03285617 0.00100746
DIFFERENCES 0.01260181 0.01217752
NYSE LOW-GROWTH -0.0184754 -0.01932938 0.00085398
HIGH-GROWTH -0.0170134 -0.01889367 0.00188027
DIFFERENCES -0.001462 -0.00043571
COMBINED LOW-GROWTH -0.02115407 -0.02054782 •0.00060625
HIGH-GROWTH -0.0324518 -0.03441891 0.00196711
DIFFERENCES 0.01129773 0.01387109
PRIMARY LOW-GROWTH -0.01768172 -0.02016193 0.00248021
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01901767 -0.02158831 0.00257064
DIFFERENCES 0.00133595 0.00142638
MULTIPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.01512005 -0.01993945 0.0048194
HIGH-GROWTH -0.0226633 -0.01887861 -0.00378469
DIFFERENCES. 0.00754325 -0.00106084
SINGLE LOW-GROWTH -0.02076051 -0.02049417 -0.00026634
HIGH-GROWTH -0.02624894 ' -0.03297753 0.00672859
DIFFERENCES 0.00548843 I 0.01248336
* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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TaMc — 16
Event day abnormal returns o f  the Industrial sample events broken down by the leverage level and growth 
level. Numbers in the parenthesis are the number o f  sample events. High-growth firms are those whose 
event year Tobin's Q is greater than on e(l) and the Tobin’s Q is also greater than the industry and 
exchange adjusted median Tobin’s Q. High-levered firms are those whose event year leverage is greater 
than the industry and exchange adjusted median leverage. Combined offerings are where on the same event 
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. Multiple issuers are those issue events issuers 
o f  which issued more than one seasoned equity issue over th* sample period (1983-1994). For Exchange 
identification o f  the sample events Compustat assigned code is used. The same procedure is used to 
separate the sample between the Industries.
LOW-LEVERED HIGH-LEVERED DIFFERENCES
TOTAL SAMPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00884247(186) -0.00690401 (315) -0.00193846
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01057633 (316) -0.01743901 (109) 0.00686268*
DIFFERENCES 0 001-3386 0.010535***
AMEX LOW-GROWTH -0.00411023 (23) -0.0121638 (21) 0.00805357
HIGH-GROWTH -0.01829031 (38) -0.02740699 (07) 0.009U668
DIFFERENCES 0.0I4I8008*** 0.01524319
NASDAQ LOW-GROWTH -0.00536496 (47) -0.00223389 (94) -0.00313107
HIGH-GROWTH -0 .01164004(152) -0.01915669(61) 0.00751665
DIFFERENCES 0.00627508 0.0169228***
NYSE LOW-GROWTH -0 .01118975(116) -0.00854669 (200) -0.00264306
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00695461 (126) -0.1318157(41) 0.12486109
DIFFERENCES -0.00423514 0.12326901
COMBINED LOW-GROWTH -0.00909656 (59) -0.00602413 (93) -0.00307243
HIGH-GROWTH -0 .01448869(141) -0.02400666 (44) 0.00951797
DIFFERENCES 0.00539213 0.01798253***
PRIMARY LOW-GROWTH -0.00872442 (127) -0.00727261 (222) -0.00145181
HIGH-GROWTH -0.00742408 (175) -0.01299321 (65) 0.00556913
DIFFERENCES -0.00130034 0.0057206
MULTIPLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00749329 (58) -0.0090129(118) 0.00151961
HIGH-GROWTH -0 .00872615(129) -0.01586748 (49) 0.00714133
DIFFERENCES 0.00123286 0.00685458
SINGLE LOW-GROWTH -0.00945381 (128) -0.00564082 (197) -0.00381299
HIGH-GROWTH -0 .01185266(187) -0.01872242 (60) 0.00686976
DIFFERENCES 0.00239885 0.0130816**
* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level


















Regression results of cross-sectional regression analysis of Overall sample (Panel A), and Industrial sample (Panel B). The dependent variables is the Evcnl-days abnormal return. 
Independent variables are: Leverage ratio (LEVRG), Tobin’s Q ratiof T-Q), Size of the seasoned equity Issue adjusted by the Market value of assets (ISUSIZE), Cashflow to total 
Assets (CFTA), Log of Market value o f Assets (L(MVA)), Dummy for the Type o f the Issue (TYPE) if the issue is a combined issue then TYPE takes value I, zero otherwise, 
and another dummy for the Multiplicity o f the lssuc(MLTPL) where, if the issue is by a multiple issuer then Ml.TPL lakes value I else takes the value zero. Dummy XNGI lakes 
value l(one) is the issue is listed in NASDAQ, 0(zcro) otherwise, and dummy XNG2 takes value l(one) is the issue is listed in NYSE else take value 0(zcro).
INTRCPT T-Q LEVRG ISUSIZE CFTA MMVA) TYPE MLTPL XNGI XNG2 ADJ R-SQ PROB>F
Paacl-A
MODEL -1 •0.00578*** -0.00220* •• 00100 00002
MODEL -2 -0.00990*** +0.00325 00009 01409
MODEL-3 -0.005SD*** •0.00226*** •0 00079 0.0093 00008
MODEL -4 -0.00357** -0.00099 -0.00427 -0.00001*** 00248 00001
MODEL-S -0.00)69* •0.00098 •0.00415 •0.00001*** +0.00144 0 0241 00001
MODEL-6 -0.00679* •0.00094 •0 00S67 -000001*** +0.00262 +0.00059 0 024) 00001
MODEL -7 •0.00644* -0.00096 -000568 -0.00001*** +0.00380 +0.00052 -0 00095 +0 00034 00230 00001
MODEL-8 -0.00913** -0.00096 •0.00533 -0.0000 !•*♦ +0 00340 +0.00036 •0 00104 +000033 +0 00368 000224 00227 00001
Paacl-B
MODEL-I -0.00644*** -0.00233*** 00103 0001)
MODEL -2 -0 00963*** -0.00070 -0.0011 08845
MODEL-3 -0.00302 -0.00305*** -0.01036* 0.0132 00008
MODEL -4 •0.00137 -0.00211** -0.01265** -000001*** 00200 00001
MODEL -S -0.00151 -0 00209*• -O.OI252** -0 00001*** +0.00140 00189 00002
MODEL -6 -0 00416 •0.00214** -0.01421** -0 00001•• +000162 +000057 00184 oooos
MODEL -7 •000304 -0.00218** -001394** •000001* +000422 +000042 -000250 +000022 00176 00015
MODEL -8 •000738 -0.00224** -001304** •0 00001* +000374 +0.00059 -0 00275 +000019 +0.00580 +0002798 00186 00019






Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and S-days cumulative abnormal return 
around the event date. Event date is the seasoned equity offering date. Sample are broken down by 
Industry, Level o f  Focus using measure o f  Herfindahl Index, and by the characteristics whether the firm 
has increased or decreased focus in the past two years. Exchange listing. Numbers in the Italic are the t- 
statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where on the same event date both primary and 


















Total Sample (5S0) 33.818% -0.0077593 -0.0222482 -0.0253050
(-6.2234969) (-10.3524879) (-8.8348033)
Banks (67) 38.806% -0.0061204 -0.0223947 -0.0281230
(-3.3220608) (-5.2758592) (-4 1881187)
Industrial (390) 34.103% •0.0081631 •0.0243086 -0.0259596
(-4.8714528) (-8.5253349) (-6.9256363)
Utilities (93) 29.032% -0.0072465 -0.0135021 -0.0204041
(-3.9996239) (-4.6325057) (-5.0737493)
Low-Focused firms (470) 34.043% -0.0081452 -0.0241938 -0.0270284
(-5.8453073) (-10.2757292) (-8.6946852)
High-focused firms (80) 32.500% -0.0054922 -0.0108177 -0.0151799
(-2.1597445) (-2.1474938) (-2.0774432)
Focus-Decreased firms (34) 41.176% +0.00032344 -0.0095545 -0.0040735
(+0.1046223) (-1.0687636) (-0.3441721)
Focus-Increased firms (108) 33.333% -0.0076122 -0.0247227 -0.0289556
(-3.0157780) (-5.1248885) (-48314578)
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Table 19
Event-day abnormal return. 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal 
return around the event date o f  seasoned equity offering by the segment sample. Differences in 
abnormal returns were also presented. Level o f  Focus using measure o f  Herfindahl Index. 
Numbers in the Italic are the t-statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where 
on the same event date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. For Industry 






TOTAL SAMPLE -5 5 0 N-470 N=80
EVENT-DAY •0.00814518 -0.00549223 -0.002653
(-5.8453073) (-2.1597445)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.02419376 -0.01081770 -0.013376• •
(-10.2757292) (-2.1474938)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.02702838 -0.01517993 -0.011848
(-8.6946852) (-2.0774432)
BANKS - 67 N=62 N=5
EVENT-DAY -0.0055017 -0.0137915 + 0.008290
(-2.9561326) (-1.5461641)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE •0.0207868 -0.0423336 +0.021547
(-4.796406J) (-2.3496704)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.0255542 -0.0599764 +0.034422
(-3.9655130) (-1.3971655)
INDUSTRIAL - 390 N=355 N=35
EVENT-DAY -0.0085817 -0.0039178 -0.004664
(-4.8317884) (-0.7952301)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.0261509 -0.0056223 -0.020529• •
(-8.8371783) (-0.5609965)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.0279010 -0.0066014 -0.021300
(-7.1976959) (-0.1711382)
UTILITIES - 93 N=53 N=40
EVENT-DAY -0.0083137 -0.0058324 -0.002481
(-3.2544202) -2.3082376
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.0150704 -0.0114242 -0.003646
(-3.7735925) -2.6762825
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.0229079 -0.0170865 -0.005821
(-4.1643687) -2.8987375
• (* •) (•«*) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level
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Table 20
Event-day abnormal return, 3-days cumulative abnormal return, and 5-days cumulative abnormal 
return around the event date o f  seasoned equity offering by the segment sample. Differences in 
abnormal returns between the focus-increased firms and focus decreased firms. Numbers in the 
Italic are the t-statistics for the abnormal returns. Combined offerings are where on the same event 
date both primary and secondary seasoned equity is offered. For Industry identification o f  the 






TOTAL SAMPLE - 142 N=34 N=I08
EVENT-DAY +0.00032344 -0.00761222 +0.007936*
(+0.1046223) (-3.0157780)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.00955451 -0.02472270 +0.015168
(-1.06876223) (-5.1248885)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.00407351 -0.02895564 +0.024882**
(-0.3441721) (-4.8314578)
BANKS - 10 N=0 N=10
EVENT-DAY - -0.0025881
(-0.6173238)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE - -0.0314057
(-1.6549402)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE - -0.0292935
(-1.4221605)
INDUSTRIAL - 92 Af=22 N=70
EVENT-DAY +0.00226902 -0.00913461 +0.011404*
(+0.5201564) (-2.4695517)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.01057471 -0.02838435 +0.017810
(-0.7705367) (-4.2042842)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.00310860 -0.03158900 +0.028480
(-0.1803045) (-3.6773759)
UTILITIES - 40 V = /2 N=28
EVENT-DAY -0.00324346 -0.00560059 +0.002357
(-0.9047715) (-2.0891593)
3-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.00768413 -0.01318178 +0.005498
(-1.7346361) (-3.4174632)
5-DAYS CUMULATIVE -0.00584251 -0.02225156 +0.016409
(-0.4771906) (-4.4701742)
* (**) (***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level


















Cross-sectional regression results of the samples used in this section of study Dependent variable is 3-DAYS COMULATIVE abnormal return. Independent variables arc; 
Herfindahl Indcx(HI), Leverage ratio(LEV), Tobin’s Q ratio. Market to Book ratio(M/B), Cashflow to total Assets(CFTA), Log of Market value of Assets (L(MVA)), Size of the 
seasoned equity Issue adjusted by the Market value of assets (ISUSIZE). Dummy HF takes value l(one) if the issuing firms is a high-focused firm and 0 (zero) otherwise, the 
dummy INC-F takes value I (one) if the firm has increased focus in the past three years, 0 (zero) otherwise.
INTCPT HF/LF-D HI LEV TOBINS Q ISUSIZE CFTA UMVA) ADJ R-SQ PROB>F
Panel-1
Overall Sample (550)
MODEL -1 •0.017649* +0.014386** -0.007877 0.0064 0.0682
MODEL -2 -0.009902 +0.015503** -0.008421 •0.013642 0.002859 0.0069 0.1061
MODEL -3 •0.009704 +O.OI3882** -0.005423 47.018798 0.000880 0.000000 0.0167 0.0163
MODEL-4 -0.012607 +0.014010** -0.006831 47.014975 0.000353 0.000000** +0.034801* 0.0205 0.0096
MODEL -5 -0.039082** +0.010874* +0.001398 -0.025446** 0.000333 0.000000 +0.035469* +0.003843** 0.0279 0.0027
Panel-2
Industrial-TOTAL
MODEL -1 -0.019553 +0.020868** -0.007453 0.0065 0 1044
MODEL -2 •0.007059 +0.022341** -0.009074 -0.024598 0.003915 0.0101 0 0951
MODEL -3 -0.006727 +0.021414** -0.007299 -0.027768* O.OQ27IO 0.000000 0.0101 0.1134
MODEL -4 -0.009641 +0.021123** -0.008686 0.024664 0.001780 0.000000 +0.031682 0.0123 0.0965




MODEL -1 •0.021860* •0.004836 47.0025 0.7216
MODEL -2 •0.009061 -0.006868 0.026081* 0.003645 0.0009 0.3444
MODEL -3 -0.008702 -0.004937 0.029647* 0.002304 0.000000 00014 0.3438
MODEL-4 •0.011557 •0.006308 0.026773 0.001325 0.000000 +0.030396 0.0034 0.2900
MODEL -5 -0.060832*** +0.007114 0.049684*** 0.002275 0.000000 +0.024938 +0.007766*** 0.02467 0.0172
Panel-4
Industrial-High Focused
MODEL -1 +0.096681 -0.109915 0.0149 0.2273
MODEL -2 +0.122617 -0.113986 0.031010 0.010054 47.0239 0.5391
MODEL -3 +0.122818 -0.115479 0.029227 0.010437 +0000000 -0.0579 0 71II
MODEL -4 +0.103106 -0.119489 +0.000282 0.017535 0.000000 +0354623 470053 04560
MODEL -5 +0.178884 •0.151455 +0.000661 0.013494 0.000000 +0 330749 47.006624 470154 04993



















Cross sectional regression results for the Industrial sample which have either increased focus or decreased focus in the past three years. Dependent variable is 
the EVENT-DAY’S abnormal return. Independent variables are: Leverage ratio(LEV), Tobin’s Q ratio, Cashflow to total Assets(CFTA), Relative issue 
size(size of the issue adjusted by the market value of assets). Variable HF/LF-D refers to Dummy which lakes value I (one) if the Arms is a high-focused 
firms at the issue announcement year and 0 (zero) otherwise. Dummy variable INC/DCR-F takes value I (one) if the firm belongs to focus increase group and 
0(zero) otherwise.
INTCPT HI INC/DCR-F IIF/LF-D LEV TOBIN’S Q ISUSIZE CFTA ADJ R-SQ PROB>F
Total Sample (142)
MODEL-1 -0.002926 +0.005920 -0.008573* 0.0071 02253
MODEL -2 -0.001786 +0.003519 •0.008613* +0.003028 0.0013 0.3674
MODEL-3 +0.008759 +0.002610 -0.009110* +0.004997 -0.025515** -0.000375 0.0290 0.1087
MODEL -4 +0.011178 +0.008006 -0.008807* +0.001990 -0.037151*** +0.003536 -0.000000** 0.0650 0.0190
MODE). -5 +0.016828 +0.005431 -0.008546* +0.003022 -0.040510*** +0.001446 -0.000000** •0.038430 0.0687 0.0198
Panel-1
Total Industrial (92)
MODEL-1 -0.001645 +0.007576 -O.OI2557* 0.0097 0 2412
MODEL -2 +0.000011 +0.003837 -0.012667* +0.006076 . 0.0027 0.3610
MODEL -3 +0.012858 +0.002027 -0.013362* +0.011013 -0.036140** +0 000152 0.0523 0.0861
MODEL -4 +0.015763 +0.010600 -0.013629* +0.007204 -0.050154*** +0.004780 -0.000000** 0.0983 0.0208
MODEL -5 +0.021331 +0.007117 -0.012671* +0.007816 -0.053153*** +0.002544 -0.000000** -0.033549 0.0956 0.0290
Panel-2
Incrcased-Focused (70)
MODEL-1 -0.016021 +0.009473 +0.003493 •0.0200 07246
MODEL -2 •0.001913 +0.005208 +0.010167 •0.036625 -0.000248 00088 03394
MODEL -3 -0.000610 +0.016169 +0.004704 -0.050719** +0.005426 -0.000000** 0.0705 0.0838




MODEL-I +0.030094 -0.056342 +0.028237 0.0499 02376
MODEL -2 +0.025627 -0.039775 +0.022106 -0 024776 +0.005480 0.0495 03190
MODEL -3 +0.026098 -0.039842 +0.022220 •0.025414 +0.005542 •0.000000 •0.0098 0 4711
MODEL -4 +0.018439 -0.027300 +0.023593 -0.025421 +0.002883 -0.000000 +0.184135 0.0816 03113
*(**)(***) denotes significant at the 0.10 (0.05) (0.01) level L3 9
Appendix A
Distribution of Sample events by two-digit SIC code representing Industry 
Classifications assigned by Compustat broken down by Total 

















01 Agric Prod-Crops 3 1 47 Transportation Services I -
10 Metal Mining 16 4 48 Communications 23 11
12 Coal Mining 1 - 49 Electric. Gas. Senetary Srvcs 191 93
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 51 26 50 Durable Goods-Wholesales 23 10
15 Bldg Constr-Gen. Op Bldr 12 7 51 Nondurable Goods-Wholesale 16 5
16 Cons traction- Heavy 3 I 52 Bldg matLHrdwr.Garden-Retl 7 I
17 Constraction-Spcl Trade I 1 53 Gen Marchandise Stores 11 4
20 Food & Kindred Products 15 6 54 Food Stores 8 4
22 Textile Mill Product 15 6 55 Auto Dealers. Gas Stations 2 1
23 Appareal & Other Fnsh Prod. 8 6 56 Apparel & Accessory Stores 9 5
24 Lumber & Wood Pds 8 4 57 Home Furniture & Equip 
Store
11 7
25 Furniture & Fixtrue 4 2 58 Eating & Drinking Places 24 9
26 Paper & Allied Products 12 3 59 Miscellaneous Retails 18 12
27 Printing. Publishing & Allied 13 5 60 Depository Institutions 106 -
28 Chemical & Allied Products 66 32 61 Nondepository Credit Instn 13 10
29 Pete Refining & Related Ind. 8 6 62 Security & Commodity Broker 9 2
30 Rubber & Misc. Plastic Prod. 12 6 63 Insurance Carriers 54 22
31 Leather & Leather Product 4 I 64 Ins Agents .Brokerage & Srvcs 2 1
32 Stone. Clay. Glass. Concrete 9 3 65 Real Estate I -
33 Primary Metal Industries 31 11 67 Holding.other Invest Offices 51 32
34 Fabr Metal. Ex Machy. Trans 12 5 70 Hotels. Other Loding Places 2 1
35 Indl.Comml.Machy.Computer 110 47 72 Personal Services 2 -
36 Electr.Oth Elec Eq. Ex Cmp 90 41 73 Business Services 58 16
37 Transportation Equipmets 30 15 75 Auto Repairs. Srvcs. Parking 2 1
38 Meas Instr.PhotoGds;Watch 61 19 76 Misc Repair Services 1 -
39 Misc Manufacturing Ind 8 2 78 Motion Pictures 5 1
40 Railroad Transportation 1 - 79 Amusements. Recreations 3 3
41 Transit & Passenger Trans 2 2 80 Health Services 34 17
42 Motor Freight Trans.Wrhous 9 3 83 Social Services 1 -
44 Water Transportation 3 1 87 Engr.Acc.Resh.Mgnt.Rel Svcs 15 9
45 Transportation by Air 25 7 99 Nonclassified Establishmedts 1 -
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APPENDIX B
The variable used in the study are calcualted as below using compustat data Item. Please 
refer to Appendix C for detail understanding of the variable names(DI stands for
Compustat data Item).
Return on Sales, ROS = DI13/DI12.
Return on Assets, ROA = DI13/DI6.
Market Value of Assets, MVA = SUM(DI9, DI10, DI34, DI235).
Return on Market Value of Assets, ROV = DI13/MVA.
Cash Flow to Total Assets. CFTA = (DI13-SUM(DI15, DI16,
DI19, DI21))/DI6.
Research & Development Expenses to Sales, RD = DI46/DI12.
Advetising Expenses to Sales, AD = DI45/DI12.
Book Value to Market Value Ratio, BM = DI6/MVA.
Intangible to Total Assets, IA = DI33/DI6.
Net Investment to Total Assets, NTTA = (SUM(DI113, DI128.DI129)
-SUM(DI107, DI109))/DI6.
Market Value of Capital Stock, MVCS = DI25*DI199.
Market Value of Equity, MVE = SUM(DI235, DI10).
Total Debt, DEBT = SUM(DI9, DI44).
Book Leverage Ratio, BL = SUM(DI9, DI44)/DI6.
Market Leverage Ratio, ML = DEBT/SUM(DEBT, MVE).
Market Leverage as suggested By Pilotte(1992),
PL = DEBT/SUM(DEBT, MVCS, DI10).
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Appendix C
The compustat data items used in calculating the variables
defined in the paper.
Compustat 
Data Item #
Compustat Data Item Names
4 C urretn Assets - Total
5 Current Liabilities - Total
6 Asstes - Total/Liabilities and Stock Holders 
Equity
9 Long-Term Debt - Total
10 Preferred Stock - Liquidating value
11 Common Stock - Tangible
12 Sales (net)
13 Operating Income Before Depreciation
15 Interst Expenses
16 Income Tax - Total
19 Dividend - Prefered
21 Dividend - Common
25 Common Share Outstanding
29 Employees
33 Intangibles
34 Debt in Current Liabilities
44 Debt Due in One Year
45 Advertinsing Expenses
46 Research and Development Expenses
107 Sale of Property, Plant, and Equipment
109 Sale of Investments
113 Increase in Investments
128 Capital expenditures ( Statem ent of Cash 
Flow)
129 Acquisitions
199 Price - Fiscal Year - Close
235 Common Equity - Liquidation Value
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